Chinese dependence on COMAC success

            The struggles involving Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) have been well documented since its formation in 2008.  The company is a conglomeration of small Chinese aircraft companies that were purchased and merged by the investment arm of the Chinese government.  COMAC struggled in its infancy, surrounded by similar rumors to that of the Shanghai Y-10 of the 1980’s, and by real-world setbacks that occurred on both of its initial project aircraft (the ARJ-21 regional jet and the C-919 narrow-body airliner).  Despite the initial trouble, COMAC has finally completed certification of its regional jet, and is in the static testing phase for the C-919, a jet that falls into the same class as the airbus A320 and the Boeing 737.  COMAC strongly believes, along with some outside sources, that their jet will compete on a global level with the current Airbus/Boeing duopoly that has the market cornered, even in China right now. 

There are many barriers to bringing a new product to market, from initial costs to company and product efficiency and how well the product is actually going to compete against aircraft that have been a staple in the industry forever.  Due to the heavy regulation of the aerospace industry worldwide, these barriers have ended many companies, and prevented just as many from emerging onto the scene.  Most companies wouldn’t even attempt developing a new aircraft when the initial cost for designing and producing one prototype C919 is around $14 billion (Perrett, 2013).  There is a two-faceted approach to this monstrous cause from the standpoint of COMAC, and especially the Chinese government.

Firstly, the Chinese regional air carrier market is booming.  Including thousands of Boeing, Airbus, and other aircraft already operating for Chinese air carriers, their market is in need of 6,300 aircraft over the next 20 years (Jiang, 2015).  At $68 million apiece (estimated), and 500 orders already “confirmed”, COMAC stands to make an estimated $34 billion within the first few years after CAAC (Civil Aviation Administration of China) certification (Dawei and Dongmei, 2012).  On this front, COMAC and the Chinese government believe they can overcome the design cost and production costs associated with fulfilling its orders.  Furthermore, at or near the $68 million dollar price tag per aircraft would definitely keep the C919 at a cheaper up front purchase price than a Boeing 737MAX ($78-$108 million) and the A320NEO ($71-$120 million) according to Boeing and Airbus website price estimates.  This makes the C919 look pretty competitive, but outside certification from the FAA or the EASA would prevent the plane from being purchased by air carriers outside of motherland China, a topic covered by my earlier blog post.  That lack of certification, along with nasty old rumors about how far behind US technology the Chinese companies are, and it makes you wonder how confirmed some of those initial orders really are. 

Which brings us to the second point.  Chinese air carriers probably don’t mind purchasing aircraft that are already available to fit their needs, but the government wants to lessen China’s dependence upon equipment from the rest of the first world.  It is another attempt to differentiate China as a global leader in technology, independent of the U.S. and its’ stuck up Boeing aircraft.  The rumors that circulate surrounding cheap Chinese labor and the efforts of their engineers and designers were an issue that ruined the Shanghai Y-10.  There were pictures and images of a torn apart Boeing 707 that supposedly confirmed that the Y-10 was reverse engineered from the 707.  That rumor was later squashed by Boeing and the designers from Shanghai Aviation Industrial Company (SAIC), but it wouldn’t prove to be enough to launch the aircraft into full scale production (Gordon and Komissarov, 2008).  These issues continued to hamper the efforts of COMAC’s ARJ21 as well, even though they continually hit rough patches where the CAAC was holding COMAC to very high standards of quality control before allowing the jet to proceed through testing and certification.  The same could be said of the C919, which hit major setbacks from weak raw materials and design aspects from Chinese companies and engineers that were flat out not going to make the cut.  These issues forced COMAC to bring in a host of foreign engineers, and it caused them to look at outfitting the C919 with a lot of systems from western aircraft (Jiang, 2015). 

The Chinese government is actually using these facts to try to bolster global support for COMAC and its future endeavors.  It shows their desire to meet standards that would make global consumers happy, profitable, and ultimately safe.  The aircraft, and their future designs, will continue to be called indigenously Chinese designs, regardless of the American fuel system and avionics package, and COMAC will be regarded for the level of safety and efficiency the jets achieve (if they do achieve anything to be heralded for).  This is another reason the Chinese government will continue to throw money at COMAC even if it takes far longer than expected (or hoped) for western approval of CAAC’s certification processes. 

The emotional drive behind the government and its policies relating to COMAC and Chinese built aircraft is extraordinarily strong.  Idea’s surrounding an independent China date back to the end of WWI, when the country was divided into territories and was governed by mostly by occupying countries.  Marxism and anti-west political figures took over and it took almost 50 years and multiple political “rearrangements” for Chinese markets to really open up to trade with the west (mainly the United States).  The pride associated with their independence is still very strong, even with globalization and today’s trade principals.  Further, modern aircraft are the epitome of technological advancement due to advanced aircraft capabilities, standards regarding public safety, and mass media coverage surrounding outstanding accomplishments and failures of this industry.  That is why China wants the world to measure its success based on COMAC’s accomplishments next to giants like Boeing and Airbus, and will continue to back their aviation projects until the rest of the world does approve, or the entire system comes crashing down. 

References:

Dawei, Y., & Dongmei, L. (2012, December 12). Comac C919 Airliner Project Flying in the Dark. Retrieved December 16, 2015, from http://english.caixin.com/2012-12-18/100474031.html

Gordon, E., & Komissarov, D. (2008). Chinese aircraft: China's aviation industry since 1951. Manchester, England: Hikoki Publications.

Jiang, S. (2015, November 2). China takes on Boeing, Airbus with new passenger jet - CNN.com.Retrieved November 7, 2015, from http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/02/asia/china-new-c919-passenger-jet/

Leighton, B. (2015, March 18). A Closer Look at the Comac C919 - Why Does it Exist? -AirlineReporter. Retrieved November 7, 2015, from http://www.airlinereporter.com/2015/03/ closer-look-comac-c919-exist/

Perrett, B. (2013, December 16). C919 May Be Largely Limited To Chinese Market. RetrievedNovember 7, 2015, from http://aviationweek.com/awin/c919-may-be-largely-limited-chinese-market

ATC privatization

     (1) The biggest reason GA is fighting the privatization of air traffic control is cash money.  Money drives everything in the industry, and is the primary reason the FAA is pushing for privatization in the first place.  GA is concerned that the majority of its participants (schools, students, weekend flyers) won't be able to pay user fees associated with funding of privately owned control facilities, an issue that GA specifically has been fighting for over a decade (Wood, 2015).  A secondary issue is that airlines and business aviation, that could afford user fees, would gain priority over general aviation users because they would add to air traffic control companies' profitability.  GA typically gives most of the right of way to faster moving traffic anyway, but GA officials fear this would make it typical on behalf of the controllers, with little or no say (barring emergencies) from pilots.

     (2) The airlines are on board for a couple of reasons, and with stipulations.  They don't want ATC to be for profit, because it would cause more issues in the system as far as what the facilities are spending their money on, which is the same issue the FAA is having now.  Airlines do, however, believe privatization could make the push for the National Airspace Revitalization Plan 2002 to become a reality, one that the industry needs desperately with growing air traffic and a shrinking control infrastructure.  Although it's still monetarily driven, the new system would allow airlines to choose the most optimized routes possible, saving billions of dollars in operating expenses, which is why some airlines are now saying we should give privatization a shot (Jansen, 2015).

     (3) There are a number of other countries that are currently employing a privatized ATC system.  Some of them are Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, France, Germany, and the UK, all first world countries with thriving aviation industries.  There is a varying degree of government control, however, similar to the government "control" over the middle eastern airlines.  Also in similar fashion, those ATC facilities run on their own revenue stream, and they make their own decisions as to how and what they spend their money on.  The bottom line for them is they are absolutely as safe and as efficient as our system.  Furthermore,  New Zealand swung from losing $10 million per year on their ATC system, to profiting $4.2 million per year after they switched to private ATC (Adams, 2005).

     (4) Congress would have to pass laws that would direct the FAA to set rules and regulations regarding what the ATC companies needed to do to maintain safety, as well as all the programs necessary to evaluate them and ensure they aren't endangering the flying public.  After that, the FAA would write the FAR's necessary and establish all their oversight programs and contacts at individual FSDO's.  The whole process could take years to finalize in our system, even longer if the fight over whether or not it's the right thing to do is carried heavily on both sides.

     (5) I believe the system would be more efficient.  Capitalism has already demonstrated companies abilities to make unbelievable amounts of money.  That being said, it has also showed, undeniably, that the people running corporations making that kind of money only do it for one thing; and that is to make that kind of money.  So many have gone to jail for ripping people off and editing the books, and if that happened in this industry, we wouldn't realize it until we had another massive disaster killing hundreds of people on a Delta airliner (for example).  I'm not convinced the ATC system itself would be safer between the time private companies took over the current system and the time that the future surveillance system is fully functioning (ADS-B and data-link communications, etc.).  Once that system is established and the airlines are operating in a "free flight" type of environment, I believe privatization won't have such a greedy impact on safety because the safety is far more controlled by the PIC's and the operations folks at the airline level.  It's a tough debate though, because without privatizing ATC and allowing them to make some kind of money, that system might continue to be pushed back and not implemented until we're already retired.

References:

Jansen, B. (2015, December 2). Call to action issued over ATC privatization. Retrieved December 7,      2015.  Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/12/01/airline-executives-urge-
     privatization-air-traffic-control/76604766/

Wood, J. (2015, July 8). Call to action issued over ATC privatization. Retrieved December 7, 2015.
     Retrieved from http://generalaviationnews.com/2015/07/08/call-to-action-issued-over-atc-  
     privatization/

GA medical reform

     (1) The agenda for GA medical reform is the same agenda that AOPA and the general aviation community has had for many years.  The difference today is the movement has finally obtained some traction in and around Washington.  After pushing the issue for over ten years, the house and senate have introduced the "Pilot's bill of rights 2", a set of rules designed to protect pilots flying for public interest, representatives of the FAA, and pilots that risk losing their freedom to fly based on outdated medical requirements (Tennyson, 2015).  AOPA has a list of senators and state representatives from both parties that have endorsed these changes, and is very confident that the changes will go through.
     (2)Currently, the pilot's bill of rights 2 is a bill that is being mulled over by the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee.  The committee will vote on the laws, as well as possible amendments to the laws, and once it passes (if it passes?) the house and senate will vote on passing the bill into legislation (Tennyson, 2015).  If it passes through congress, the president will then have to sign the bill to make it officially legal legislation.  Then, the administrator will follow the letters of the laws to write proper regulations (or amend regulations) into the FAR's for the aviation community to follow accordingly.

     (3)In my opinion, the biggest aspect to the new rules would be the financial impact.  I will say, though, that that is a sad statement considering the rules are being built around an individuals health and its effect on public safety.  Low balling the estimate, the FAA alone stands to save at least $2.49 million each year by cutting out the processes associated with approving third class medicals.  Furthermore, pilots will save around $20 million nation wide, all of which would likely be put directly back into the industry which provides about $219 billion to the U.S. economy each year (Stanley, 2015).  The negative side of this aspect is the small likelihood that someone operating an aircraft in an unsafe manor (after smoking marijuana or losing his mental stability), and you "can't put a price tag on the public safety".  There are some senators, as well as members of the NTSB that are so afraid of this that they will fight for the third class medical until the president signs off on it.  I would say that I agree that safety shouldn't have a price tag that's too far out of reach. However, safety has never been effected by individuals with expired or non-existent medical forms, meaning no aviation accident in the NTSB archive was caused by a pilot (or otherwise) that was flying on an expired or non-existent medical certificate.  Furthermore, there are multiple instances where non-pilots and co-pilots, from general aviation all the way up to 121 major carriers, were forced to land an aircraft because the pilot flying became incapacitated or died while flying with a current and valid medical certificate.  Even the germanwings pilot voids this argument, as he was an individual who did report his issues, who was documented as possibly suspect, and he was still allowed to fly his passengers into the Alps.  Something as simple as a third class medical screening is not going to prevent things like this from happening, but it will prevent many thousands of ageing pilots and upcoming hopeful's from experiencing the love of flight due to minor health problems that have no consequence on their flying.

     (4)I believe that reform is necessary because too many people are being turned away from a slowly dying industry that used to be so beautiful when thriving.  With manufacturing costs skyrocketing from regulations and fuel prices costing more than quality draft beer at high priced bars,  its difficult enough to fly for those of us who can easily pass the current medical requirements.  We need all the income we can get at FBO's and public use airports by allowing as many people as possible to fly, especially those with the means and the passion who might be just a bit older or a bit heavier than the rest of us.


References:

Stanely, C. (2015, February 28). The FAA and NTSB vs. Common Sense: Part Deux. Retrieved
     December 1, 2015, from http://jonathanturley.org/2015/02/28/the-faa-and-ntsb-vs-common-
     sense- part-deux/

Tennyson, E. (2015, November 18). Closer than ever. Retrieved December 1, 2015, from
     http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2015/November/18/Closer-than-ever