(1)There are a multitude of airlines that receive massive amount of government aid in order to maintain their operations. There are three that are being accused, by a group of American based airlines, of taking an unfair advantage of these subsidies to continue operating with prices and services that other airlines can't compete with. Etihad, Emirates, and Qatar airlines are all under fire for potentially violating the Open Skies agreement that governs international airline competition. Etihad airlines is based near Abu Dhabi international airport and is the second largest airport in the United Arab Emirates, behind Emirates Airlines. Both of those two are government owned air carriers that are allowed to fly to and from American cities for international air travel competition. Qatar airlines is owned by the Qatari government and provides flights to and from Doha, as well as to other parts of India, Asia, and Africa. They all receive subsidies such as fuel hedges, interest free loans, and cheap landing fees in their home airports (Yglesias, 2015).
(2)In the past, the big three legacy airlines (Delta, American, and United) have taken "subsidies" from the US government too. The vast majority of these came after 9/11, in the form of interest free loans and debt relief from chapter 11 bankruptcy, which they were allowed to file when the industry all but crashed after the terrorist attacks. While it seems like comparing apples to oranges, this is one of the counter arguments based on a study funded by Etihad, who claims that this is proof that the legacy airlines play ball the same way they do (US Carriers, 2015). The study claims the US carriers have received as much as $71.5 Billion. Specifically, it cites:
$761 million was granted to Delta by Minnesota to build a fleet maintenance facility
$80-85 million received by American Airlines for redevelopment funds from Missouri in 2003
$6.3 million received by United Airlines in tax credits from Colorado
(3)The secondary claim that the foreign long haul carriers have had access to "cheaper than market value" aircraft comes from an excessive use of the US export-import bank. The US export-import bank is an institution established by the government that gives loans to countries or firms that wouldn't have easy access to capital by other means, in order for those countries or firms to purchase US made tools or equipment (Bhaskara, 2014). The complaint by the legacy airlines stems from the excessive purchases made through the export-import bank by Emirates, Etihad, and Qatar airlines, all of whom have relatively easy access to capital through regular commercial lending institutions. They have purchased more Boeing aircraft than any other airlines in the world, including our own, and they've used over $3 billion each in export-import authorizations between 2004 and 2013 (Bhaskara, 2014). This is an over use of the export-import bank by companies that are more than qualified to get loans at commercial interest rates, and it's a form of US government subsidized money that's given directly to US based airline's competition.
(4)From the viewpoint of a capitalist, it's hard to say what's fair and what isn't. If your company has a capability of turning a profit, that's all that really matters and you are free to go for everything you can get away with. As an American, it's terrible practice to give foreign competition better access than our own industry professionals to top notch American equipment. It is true that American, Delta, or United can't provide the same services for a better or equal price when the middle east airlines are getting a steal of deal on gas and airport fees, meaning travelers are going to spend their money with the companies that can provide the better deal. It is estimated that each time a flight is lost to competition this way, the legacy airlines lose up to 800 American jobs (U.S. airlines, n.d.). That shouldn't be acceptable, regardless of what air travelers want. Travelers are either vacationing with extra money they've already earned in some other career field that's not affected by this issue, or their traveling on company money for business. Limiting their options for travel doesn't equate to a single grain of rice on the scale to me. Losing jobs that are supposed to be middle class and family supportive by selling out to the competition is heart breaking, and we shouldn't be allowing it to happen to our own countrymen.
That being said, the situation gets more complex because cutting off the export-import access throws Boeing under the bus as a manufacturer. Therefore, the only option might be to cut off the access given to the middle east airlines by the open skies agreement, the opposite of what the legacy airlines claim that they're trying to do, and the opposite of what being fair means.
References:
Bhaskara, V. (2014, September 2). The Fight Over the Export-Import Bank Has No Easy Answers.
Retrieved October 22, 2015, from http://www.forbes.com/sites/airchive/2014/09/02/the-fight-
over-the-export-import-bank-has-no-easy-answers/
Noakes, G. (2015, May 15). US carriers 'have received $71.5 billion in state-aid' - Business Traveller.
Retrieved October 22, 2015, from http://www.businesstraveller.com/news/101647/us-carriers-
have-received-dollar-71.5bn-in-stat
U.S. airlines, unions reveal evidence of $42 billion in subsidies. (n.d.). Retrieved October 22, 2015,
from http://www.openandfairskies.com/press-releases/u-s-airlines-unions-reveal-evidence-of-42-
billion/
Yglesias, M. (2015, March 27). America's biggest airlines are accusing Persian Gulf carriers of
cheating. Retrieved October 22, 2015, from http://www.vox.com/2015/3/27/8296495/gulf-airline-
subsidies
Sunday, October 25, 2015
Sunday, October 18, 2015
Flight duty hours and Cargo Ops
(1) The Colgan accident is considered a watershed accident for regional airline operations in the US. That accident pointed out numerous issues with the industry that we could no longer go on ignoring. One of those issues was that of pilot fatigue. The old regulations only limited schedulers to giving pilots 8 hours off between up to 16 hour duty periods (Boxer, 2015). The legislation passed after this accident now requires a scientific based 10 hour rest period for pilots, as well as a duty day maximum of 9-14 hours depending on number of legs flown and the time of day the crew shows up for work (FAA, 2011). The pilot's commute to work is still not a consideration for interrupting the rest period or counting for duty time.
A second issue that was approached was flight training standards. The FAA has mandated specific simulator training for loss of control events following the Colgan captain's failure to prevent and recover from a stall. These situations were typically covered in simulator training programs, but they weren't specifically legislated to be taught or taught a certain way or number of times. The FAA also passed the notorious "1500 hour" rule as a result of this accident. This rule requires part 121 operators to hire pilots that have at least 1500 total hours, whereas the old legal minimum was 250 hours, 23 years of age, commercial certificate with instrument rating (Tumulty, 2014). There are some exceptions, such as part 141 certified 4 year college programs and military pilots, who can be hired at 1,000 and 750 hours, respectively.
The last rule that was updated was a result of the crash victims families from the Colgan accident, and that was a requirement for airlines to specifically disclose code-sharing agreements when their flights were being operated by their regional underlings (Tumulty, 2014). The families demonstrated that they expected Continental safety and Continental training, only to find out after this accident that there is a major gap between regional and major operators.
(2) Currently, the requirement for cargo pilots to be hired is set by company minimums. The old rule of 250 hours, commercial license with instrument rating, 23 year old, would have applied until the new regulations were released, I believe. Furthermore, these pilots only have to be given a rest period of 8 hours (from the time they shut the aircraft down, not the time they get home or in bed) and they can be flown up to as much as a 16 hour duty day.
(3) I believe the biggest factor in the exemption is cold, hard, cash money. The preamble to the final rule goes extensively into the cost to benefit ratios for operators, stating that public safety is well worth the $135 million (at least) that operators will spend on training program improvements for pilots that want ATP's under the new regulations. It states how operators will make up for these costs, but they specifically refer to part 121, 135, and 91 operators. The cargo operators, especially larger ones like Fed Ex, have spent over $140 million dollars on political lobbying since Obama took the presidential office (Goelz, & Hall 2014). The cargo carriers were included in the new crew rest rules NPRM, but were stricken from the final rule most likely due to lobbying that costs would outweigh benefits and would put some carriers out of business altogether.
(4) I do believe these carriers should be included in the new rules. Fatigue has been an issue for a very long time, and it applies to all humans regardless of what plane they fly. The new rules aren't created in Oklahoma to make activists happy (in this case), they're based on scientific evidence concerning our circadian rhythms and sleep cycles. Cargo pilots fly fast, massive jets identical to those of passenger carriers, just as capable of destroying property and killing people on the ground when mistakes are made while flying fatigued. As far as the 1500 hour rule, I don't think that one should be applied to any airline in the manner that it is being applied. The Colgan pilots were far beyond 1500 hours, and even more important, they both had over 1,000 hours of turbine time. They are a perfect example of why training and tracking competency is far more important than total time, and I'm not really sure why the FAA followed through on this requirement.
(5) From a pilot perspective, the new rules being applied to the cargo operators would limit the opportunities for me to get into a turbine powered aircraft earlier than 1500 hours. Currently, the cargo operators provide a good path to airline flying by allowing pilots in at company minimums and paying far better than what a flight school pays its instructors. For me personally, this would make a huge difference because I have a family of 4 to provide for, rather than just myself. Furthermore, if companies were to go out of business because of the crew rest requirements, this means there are less job opportunities no matter how many hours you have. The industry is doing great at the moment, so this probably wouldn't make a huge issue for most of us. If the new rules were to put us back into the '90's, as far as difficulty in getting a pilot job is concerned, those positions in a cargo outfit could be instrumental in a pilot's ability to initiate and complete a career in aviation.
References:
Hall, J., & Goelz, P. (2014, September 11). Cargo pilot hours should be regulated, too: Column.
Retrieved October 18, 2015, from http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/09/11/cargo-
pilot-airline-safety-fatigue-regulations-commercial-column/15474061/
Legislation would extend rest requirements to cargo pilots. (2015, June 24). Retrieved October 18,
2015, from http://www.safetyandhealthmagazine.com/articles/12556-legislation-would-extend-
rest-requirements-to-cargo-pilots
Press Release – FAA Issues Final Rule on Pilot Fatigue. (2011, December 21). Retrieved October 18,
2015, from https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=13272
Tumulty, B. (2014, February 11). 5 years after N.Y. crash, some airline safety progress. Retrieved
October 18, 2015, from http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/02/11/colgan-air-crash-
prompts-safety-regulations/5372353/
A second issue that was approached was flight training standards. The FAA has mandated specific simulator training for loss of control events following the Colgan captain's failure to prevent and recover from a stall. These situations were typically covered in simulator training programs, but they weren't specifically legislated to be taught or taught a certain way or number of times. The FAA also passed the notorious "1500 hour" rule as a result of this accident. This rule requires part 121 operators to hire pilots that have at least 1500 total hours, whereas the old legal minimum was 250 hours, 23 years of age, commercial certificate with instrument rating (Tumulty, 2014). There are some exceptions, such as part 141 certified 4 year college programs and military pilots, who can be hired at 1,000 and 750 hours, respectively.
The last rule that was updated was a result of the crash victims families from the Colgan accident, and that was a requirement for airlines to specifically disclose code-sharing agreements when their flights were being operated by their regional underlings (Tumulty, 2014). The families demonstrated that they expected Continental safety and Continental training, only to find out after this accident that there is a major gap between regional and major operators.
(2) Currently, the requirement for cargo pilots to be hired is set by company minimums. The old rule of 250 hours, commercial license with instrument rating, 23 year old, would have applied until the new regulations were released, I believe. Furthermore, these pilots only have to be given a rest period of 8 hours (from the time they shut the aircraft down, not the time they get home or in bed) and they can be flown up to as much as a 16 hour duty day.
(3) I believe the biggest factor in the exemption is cold, hard, cash money. The preamble to the final rule goes extensively into the cost to benefit ratios for operators, stating that public safety is well worth the $135 million (at least) that operators will spend on training program improvements for pilots that want ATP's under the new regulations. It states how operators will make up for these costs, but they specifically refer to part 121, 135, and 91 operators. The cargo operators, especially larger ones like Fed Ex, have spent over $140 million dollars on political lobbying since Obama took the presidential office (Goelz, & Hall 2014). The cargo carriers were included in the new crew rest rules NPRM, but were stricken from the final rule most likely due to lobbying that costs would outweigh benefits and would put some carriers out of business altogether.
(4) I do believe these carriers should be included in the new rules. Fatigue has been an issue for a very long time, and it applies to all humans regardless of what plane they fly. The new rules aren't created in Oklahoma to make activists happy (in this case), they're based on scientific evidence concerning our circadian rhythms and sleep cycles. Cargo pilots fly fast, massive jets identical to those of passenger carriers, just as capable of destroying property and killing people on the ground when mistakes are made while flying fatigued. As far as the 1500 hour rule, I don't think that one should be applied to any airline in the manner that it is being applied. The Colgan pilots were far beyond 1500 hours, and even more important, they both had over 1,000 hours of turbine time. They are a perfect example of why training and tracking competency is far more important than total time, and I'm not really sure why the FAA followed through on this requirement.
(5) From a pilot perspective, the new rules being applied to the cargo operators would limit the opportunities for me to get into a turbine powered aircraft earlier than 1500 hours. Currently, the cargo operators provide a good path to airline flying by allowing pilots in at company minimums and paying far better than what a flight school pays its instructors. For me personally, this would make a huge difference because I have a family of 4 to provide for, rather than just myself. Furthermore, if companies were to go out of business because of the crew rest requirements, this means there are less job opportunities no matter how many hours you have. The industry is doing great at the moment, so this probably wouldn't make a huge issue for most of us. If the new rules were to put us back into the '90's, as far as difficulty in getting a pilot job is concerned, those positions in a cargo outfit could be instrumental in a pilot's ability to initiate and complete a career in aviation.
References:
Hall, J., & Goelz, P. (2014, September 11). Cargo pilot hours should be regulated, too: Column.
Retrieved October 18, 2015, from http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/09/11/cargo-
pilot-airline-safety-fatigue-regulations-commercial-column/15474061/
Legislation would extend rest requirements to cargo pilots. (2015, June 24). Retrieved October 18,
2015, from http://www.safetyandhealthmagazine.com/articles/12556-legislation-would-extend-
rest-requirements-to-cargo-pilots
Press Release – FAA Issues Final Rule on Pilot Fatigue. (2011, December 21). Retrieved October 18,
2015, from https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=13272
Tumulty, B. (2014, February 11). 5 years after N.Y. crash, some airline safety progress. Retrieved
October 18, 2015, from http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/02/11/colgan-air-crash-
prompts-safety-regulations/5372353/
Sunday, October 11, 2015
Flying Cheap
The buzz around the regional industry is a good one from the standpoint of an aviation student who is legitimately targeting a career in the airline industry. We've had two meetings over the last year with two different regional carriers at Eagle Flight, both of which were encouraging to students because the focus was on the hiring process and what to do for the interviews. There was never a thought of we won't take people because we're full right now, and the attrition rate in training is minimal because the hiring process is supposed to weed out weak candidates. Endeavor planned on hiring 30 people every 30 days for the foreseeable future, even out to 4 years from now. This buzz seemingly represents the need for pilots right at the regional level. This argument is a multi-headed one I believe, and Endeavor also represented the side of the ALPA by showing us their Delta gateway program and signing bonus that they've implemented to battle the argument for higher pilot wages.
According to the ALPA, there are tens of thousands of pilots that would could qualify as regional first officers based on the new regulations, ATP requirements, and their current medical certificates. In my opinion, they're including a decent handful of people that have no desire to be an airline pilot. These estimates include guys with 135 jobs, career instructors, and life long GA pilots that happen to be over or close to 1500 total hours. When you subtract those numbers, I personally doubt that number is in the tens of thousands area. Furthermore, I believe some of those people wouldn't make it through the interview process, no matter how badly the regional's need pilots. In agreement with the ALPA, however, I believe a number of these candidates would be further attracted to a regional job with the perks that ALPA says are the cause of the pilot shortage itself, as it were. ALPA claims that unless we work to make the airline pilot profession an attractive career, providing livable wage, benefits, and career-progression opportunities, we will for sure be faced with a shortage of qualified pilots (ALPA, 2015).
The other side of the coin comes directly from the regional airlines themselves. Carriers like Republic Airways Holdings complain because they've had to cut down flights, which has cut down their stock prices, because they can't hire enough pilots to fly all their lines (Schmertz, 2015). Others, like Hopscotch Air, Endeavor, and Trans States, are realizing their business models have to change to incorporate a culture and wages that aspiring pilots will desire (Schmertz, 2015). A lot of carriers are blaming the FAA requirements for minimums of 1500 hours (with exceptions) to enter training to fill a pilot position with these regional carriers (Jansen, 2015). Those, in conjunction with the mandatory retirement age set by the FAA, have the regional's losing pilots from their top tier to the majors and they can't fill from the bottom, a lose-lose situation according to carriers.
The ALPA says the FAA’s new first officer qualification rules were not intended to, and cannot, address the airline industry’s broken business model as it relates to regional air carrier operations and profitability (ALPA, 2015). The broken business model they're referring to is the one regional carriers use to make money. The advanced aircraft they fly and the short distances they fly them mean the variable operating expenses they face are relatively high. They have the same cost of maintenance as any 121 operator, but they have to take all that on at their own level since the major airlines only help them out as far as painting major's paint schemes on the regional's planes and boarding passes. Therefore, they can't afford to pay pilots what some believe pilots should be paid. In fact, the five lowest paid first year pilots make between 20 and 21 thousand dollars for the first year (ALPA, 2015).
Other organizations are already well aware of these issues and have addressed them, such as the International Federation of Air Traffic Controller's Association and the National Air Traffic Controller's Association in the US. Furthermore, companies pay mechanics very well thanks to their representation by the Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association (AMFA). Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) represents manufacturers in the industry dealings, and the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE), along with IATA, represent management spots and what they have to offer our community also. ALPA actually addresses paying all these highly skilled professions well on their website, as another point in the broken business model for regional air carriers.
I do not believe there is sufficient evidence to support the complaints of the regional airlines, even in their fight with congress over the 1500 hour rule. The government accountability office stated in 2014 that the demand for air travel had not exceeded the supply of new pilots, even though 11/12 regional carriers contacted by USA Today claimed issues of hiring new pilots (Jansen, 2015). From an aspiring pilots standpoint, I know 90% of the aviation program I'm in can't wait to get in with a regional to begin their path to the majors. That's approximately 100 candidates right here from EMU. Also from our standpoint, the 1500 hour rule makes it very difficult for some of us to reach the minimum, and we'd love to see that repealed or at least reduced to some extent. That would decrease student loan debt, alleviate some of the stress of instructing or trying to find jobs banner towing, and would assist with the problem of getting burnt out in small single engine aircraft to the point where flying is borderline unenjoyable. There are plenty of pilots hired with with only a few hundred hours that have progressed just fine in the airlines, and the ones that crashed in the Colgan accident had 2,200 and 3,400 hours each. I believe, as the FAA legislated after that accident, more in depth training would've been a far better solution than the 1500 hour rule. I firmly believe, for both parties, we need to continue the fight with Washington to reduce that number, although the solution to the pilot shortage itself is going to come from improving regional profitability and providing a decent lifestyle to their pilots, and all their professional personnel.
The corporate culture that surrounded the pilots of the Colgan accident was one of cheapness, for sure, as the flying cheap documentary points out. Professionalism, to me, is being the best at what you do. This means maintaining all the situational awareness you can on mission, honing your physical and mental skills to be more efficient and precise with decisions and movements, and doing everything it takes to accomplish that mission. Our mission as pilots, with the FAA's proactive safe culture, is to get our passengers and crew from pint A to point B as safely as possible.
One example from the movie is the addition of a check airman to the new aircraft acquired by Colgan before the buffalo accident. It is unsafe to put a warm body in a check airman position just to fill a legal requirement so your company can take on routes it's unprepared for in order to increase profitability. The guy they chose to fill the spot as the guy who makes sure other pilots know their stuff, knew nothing at all about the airplane he was going to be assigned to. Another premium example is the pressure captains would receive from the Colgan's that had infiltrated their own organization. The captain in the video said there was a Colgan in every office, and they would tell him they'd find someone else to do the job if he said he wasn't comfortable going. That pressure comes from guys who've never sat in the front seat of an aircraft and had to make that decision of whether or not to go. Even with the incredible amount of legislation passed by the FAA over the years, the pilot in command STILL has legal authority to make that decision.
I do believe the tiny compensation for first year, and even fourth and fifth year first officers, is absolutely a contributing factor in the lack of professionalism in the pilots themselves. They're already subjected to 16 hour days, multiple days away from home, and flying 10 legs a day. On top of that, they're resting in crash pads with 10 other guys coming and going at all hours, all because they're not paid well enough to rent a place that would be better. The stress, the amount of training and knowledge required, the level of safety required to be a pilot is incredibly high, and $20,000 a year isn't even close to compensating for that.
For me to remain professional as a pilot, I'll have to primarily focus on the fact that people have willingly placed their lives in my hands. Stemming from military experience where people live or die based on my inputs, this is critically embedded in my decision making process. I believe any person that places a decent value on human life should be concerned with that over all else. The airplane, your record, or your income wouldn't mean a damn thing to you if your spouse, child, or sibling was put in danger, so why would I be the person subjecting someone else's relative to that danger? Secondly, the decision for safe operation of the flight always comes back to the pilot in command when the engines are running on his or her airplane. I will never forget that, and no amount of pressure from a guy type rated in an Ikea mahogany two-tier is going to change that. There used to be a level of pride associated with being a pilot, and that has seemed to diminish greatly in the world of regional air carriers. I think that's in part because of the low pay, and lack of straight forward career progression. People get nervous with the tension that comes with dealing with people like the Colgan's, wanting to keep their jobs and keep moving forward toward a major carrier. I have to maintain that pride and remember that the decisions are mine, and that they can't fire me over it because its not making them enough family money. If they do, I'm sure there's some legal action that can be taken since the FAA says its my decision, and not theirs.
References:
ADVANCING AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY SINCE 1931. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12,
2015, from http://www.alpa.org/advocacy/pilot-pay-shortage
Jansen, B. (2015, August 27). Airline fears of pilot shortage spark Congress fight over required
training. Retrieved October 10, 2015, from
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/27/pilot-shortage-faa-1500-hours-required-colgan-
crash-alpa/32008451/
Schmertz, A. (2015, September 4). Airlines Complain About Pilot Shortage They Created. Retrieved
October 12, 2015, from https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/airlines-complain-pilot-shortage-created-
andrew-schmertz
Young, R. (Director). (2010). Flying cheap [Motion picture]. WGBH Educational Founation.
According to the ALPA, there are tens of thousands of pilots that would could qualify as regional first officers based on the new regulations, ATP requirements, and their current medical certificates. In my opinion, they're including a decent handful of people that have no desire to be an airline pilot. These estimates include guys with 135 jobs, career instructors, and life long GA pilots that happen to be over or close to 1500 total hours. When you subtract those numbers, I personally doubt that number is in the tens of thousands area. Furthermore, I believe some of those people wouldn't make it through the interview process, no matter how badly the regional's need pilots. In agreement with the ALPA, however, I believe a number of these candidates would be further attracted to a regional job with the perks that ALPA says are the cause of the pilot shortage itself, as it were. ALPA claims that unless we work to make the airline pilot profession an attractive career, providing livable wage, benefits, and career-progression opportunities, we will for sure be faced with a shortage of qualified pilots (ALPA, 2015).
The other side of the coin comes directly from the regional airlines themselves. Carriers like Republic Airways Holdings complain because they've had to cut down flights, which has cut down their stock prices, because they can't hire enough pilots to fly all their lines (Schmertz, 2015). Others, like Hopscotch Air, Endeavor, and Trans States, are realizing their business models have to change to incorporate a culture and wages that aspiring pilots will desire (Schmertz, 2015). A lot of carriers are blaming the FAA requirements for minimums of 1500 hours (with exceptions) to enter training to fill a pilot position with these regional carriers (Jansen, 2015). Those, in conjunction with the mandatory retirement age set by the FAA, have the regional's losing pilots from their top tier to the majors and they can't fill from the bottom, a lose-lose situation according to carriers.
The ALPA says the FAA’s new first officer qualification rules were not intended to, and cannot, address the airline industry’s broken business model as it relates to regional air carrier operations and profitability (ALPA, 2015). The broken business model they're referring to is the one regional carriers use to make money. The advanced aircraft they fly and the short distances they fly them mean the variable operating expenses they face are relatively high. They have the same cost of maintenance as any 121 operator, but they have to take all that on at their own level since the major airlines only help them out as far as painting major's paint schemes on the regional's planes and boarding passes. Therefore, they can't afford to pay pilots what some believe pilots should be paid. In fact, the five lowest paid first year pilots make between 20 and 21 thousand dollars for the first year (ALPA, 2015).
Other organizations are already well aware of these issues and have addressed them, such as the International Federation of Air Traffic Controller's Association and the National Air Traffic Controller's Association in the US. Furthermore, companies pay mechanics very well thanks to their representation by the Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association (AMFA). Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) represents manufacturers in the industry dealings, and the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE), along with IATA, represent management spots and what they have to offer our community also. ALPA actually addresses paying all these highly skilled professions well on their website, as another point in the broken business model for regional air carriers.
I do not believe there is sufficient evidence to support the complaints of the regional airlines, even in their fight with congress over the 1500 hour rule. The government accountability office stated in 2014 that the demand for air travel had not exceeded the supply of new pilots, even though 11/12 regional carriers contacted by USA Today claimed issues of hiring new pilots (Jansen, 2015). From an aspiring pilots standpoint, I know 90% of the aviation program I'm in can't wait to get in with a regional to begin their path to the majors. That's approximately 100 candidates right here from EMU. Also from our standpoint, the 1500 hour rule makes it very difficult for some of us to reach the minimum, and we'd love to see that repealed or at least reduced to some extent. That would decrease student loan debt, alleviate some of the stress of instructing or trying to find jobs banner towing, and would assist with the problem of getting burnt out in small single engine aircraft to the point where flying is borderline unenjoyable. There are plenty of pilots hired with with only a few hundred hours that have progressed just fine in the airlines, and the ones that crashed in the Colgan accident had 2,200 and 3,400 hours each. I believe, as the FAA legislated after that accident, more in depth training would've been a far better solution than the 1500 hour rule. I firmly believe, for both parties, we need to continue the fight with Washington to reduce that number, although the solution to the pilot shortage itself is going to come from improving regional profitability and providing a decent lifestyle to their pilots, and all their professional personnel.
The corporate culture that surrounded the pilots of the Colgan accident was one of cheapness, for sure, as the flying cheap documentary points out. Professionalism, to me, is being the best at what you do. This means maintaining all the situational awareness you can on mission, honing your physical and mental skills to be more efficient and precise with decisions and movements, and doing everything it takes to accomplish that mission. Our mission as pilots, with the FAA's proactive safe culture, is to get our passengers and crew from pint A to point B as safely as possible.
One example from the movie is the addition of a check airman to the new aircraft acquired by Colgan before the buffalo accident. It is unsafe to put a warm body in a check airman position just to fill a legal requirement so your company can take on routes it's unprepared for in order to increase profitability. The guy they chose to fill the spot as the guy who makes sure other pilots know their stuff, knew nothing at all about the airplane he was going to be assigned to. Another premium example is the pressure captains would receive from the Colgan's that had infiltrated their own organization. The captain in the video said there was a Colgan in every office, and they would tell him they'd find someone else to do the job if he said he wasn't comfortable going. That pressure comes from guys who've never sat in the front seat of an aircraft and had to make that decision of whether or not to go. Even with the incredible amount of legislation passed by the FAA over the years, the pilot in command STILL has legal authority to make that decision.
I do believe the tiny compensation for first year, and even fourth and fifth year first officers, is absolutely a contributing factor in the lack of professionalism in the pilots themselves. They're already subjected to 16 hour days, multiple days away from home, and flying 10 legs a day. On top of that, they're resting in crash pads with 10 other guys coming and going at all hours, all because they're not paid well enough to rent a place that would be better. The stress, the amount of training and knowledge required, the level of safety required to be a pilot is incredibly high, and $20,000 a year isn't even close to compensating for that.
For me to remain professional as a pilot, I'll have to primarily focus on the fact that people have willingly placed their lives in my hands. Stemming from military experience where people live or die based on my inputs, this is critically embedded in my decision making process. I believe any person that places a decent value on human life should be concerned with that over all else. The airplane, your record, or your income wouldn't mean a damn thing to you if your spouse, child, or sibling was put in danger, so why would I be the person subjecting someone else's relative to that danger? Secondly, the decision for safe operation of the flight always comes back to the pilot in command when the engines are running on his or her airplane. I will never forget that, and no amount of pressure from a guy type rated in an Ikea mahogany two-tier is going to change that. There used to be a level of pride associated with being a pilot, and that has seemed to diminish greatly in the world of regional air carriers. I think that's in part because of the low pay, and lack of straight forward career progression. People get nervous with the tension that comes with dealing with people like the Colgan's, wanting to keep their jobs and keep moving forward toward a major carrier. I have to maintain that pride and remember that the decisions are mine, and that they can't fire me over it because its not making them enough family money. If they do, I'm sure there's some legal action that can be taken since the FAA says its my decision, and not theirs.
References:
ADVANCING AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY SINCE 1931. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12,
2015, from http://www.alpa.org/advocacy/pilot-pay-shortage
Jansen, B. (2015, August 27). Airline fears of pilot shortage spark Congress fight over required
training. Retrieved October 10, 2015, from
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/27/pilot-shortage-faa-1500-hours-required-colgan-
crash-alpa/32008451/
Schmertz, A. (2015, September 4). Airlines Complain About Pilot Shortage They Created. Retrieved
October 12, 2015, from https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/airlines-complain-pilot-shortage-created-
andrew-schmertz
Young, R. (Director). (2010). Flying cheap [Motion picture]. WGBH Educational Founation.
Monday, October 5, 2015
UAS's place in the National Airspace System
UAS's (unmanned aerial systems) is a broad term used to describe powered vehicles that fly through the air, controlled by computer programming or remotely located operators. As technology has increased over the years, these have developed from small, basic radio controlled (RC) airplanes into complex, expensive RC airplanes and into affordable drones such as quadcopters (4 engine helicopter style drones). The relative simplicity and affordability, coupled with proven technology and military applications, has lead to a recent surge in promoting the integration of certain UAS's into the National Airspace System for commercial purposes.
(1) Currently, civilian use of UAS's is restricted to recreational use only, unless they obtain a waiver from the FAA. People that use them in a fashion similar to model aircraft don't need FAA permission to operate them. People can be held liable, however, if they fly over people or in a manner that endangers people, property, or wildlife. The new regulations are being written to provide rules for non-recreational use, or essentially, commercial use. These rules would allow for commercial use in areas that are already permitted by the FAA via a certificate of waiver or authorization (COA), but would be on a certified, permanent basis rather than a case by case basis. The ability to apply for these permits came about with the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FAA, 2015). Currently, companies can use UAS's for things like hurricane hunting, search and rescue, wildlife conservation, and 3-D mapping (Handwerk, 2013). Also, utilizing drones for aeronautical research is permitted, which is what Amazon is doing with the drones they plan to use for commercial shipping operations. Finally, some UAS's are being used for commercial aerial photography or cinematography as well.
The companies that obtain the COA's are expected to follow the guidelines set in advisory circular 91-57A, as well as be registered prior to the application for the COA (FAA, 2015). These guidelines are the baseline for the rules that are supposed to be finalized any day now for future commercial use of drones. In addition to the vague, safety guidelines in the AC, the new rules will impose an altitude limit, speed limit, weight limit, daylight operations only limit, and limits on what weather operators can launch flights into. Other things will include proper registration markings, proper maintenance, and pre-flight inspections of the UAS also. Finally, operators will have to pass an initial aerial knowledge test, obtain an operator certificate and small UAS rating, and provide the ability for the FAA to conduct inspections of the operation. Although these might seem costly and restrictive, the worst part for commercial operations is that the UAS must remain within visual line of sight (VLOS) of the operator. This would most likely prevent Amazon from initiating it's GPS based package delivery system, at least for now.
(2) I do believe we are going to see full integration of not only small UAS's, but full scale remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) as well. The administrator, Michael Huerta, has identified this integration process as a priority item for the FAA over the next few years (FAA, 2015). The current NPRM for commercial use of UAS's is supposed to be passed into law any day now, meaning the initial implementation, with all of the restrictions on speed, weight, and altitude, will be the first step toward full integration. Assuming that we don't see any accidents specifically related to mechanical or electronic signals transmission issues, the next step would be to reduce those limits and allow these vehicles to proceed at altitudes and speeds that could match manned aircraft.
Current programming and GPS navigation systems are already physically capable of beyond VLOS capabilities, including take off, landing/ dropping a parcel, and returning to base (RTB). There are shelf available quad-copters that can even do this. A proper pre-flight inspection to assure the engines run and there is enough battery life for the flight could be the last line of defense before a sightless vehicle completely enters manned airspace on a programmed flight profile. This is how most of the military RPV's operate to and from their area of responsibility, the only difference being they have pilots overseeing the entire process. Another issue would be that of making in flight corrections. The weather can change along the route of flight, VFR manned aircraft could be practicing maneuvers near a "highway" (as proposed by Amazon), and without a direct connection to ATC, changing the flight path of the UAS might not be an option. The remote operators will have an extremely difficult time building a big picture of the operating airspace with out proper communications.
The perception problem coming from the public's eye is going to be extremely similar to that of the commercial space travel issue. The inherent danger, coupled with America's drama driven mass media sources, will be plenty to establish a giant, skeptical public stance against integration above the limitations in the upcoming legislation. Logistical issues will play a part in the defense as well, because ATC is going to have to account for these vehicles and will absolutely need a tool for spacing and collision avoidance between all aircraft in the busiest airspace on Earth. Terrifying stories of crashes and close encounters, like the ones I have from Afghanistan, will provide real world experience instead of just think tank theories. These collisions are an existing problem to the full integration of these vehicles.
(3)The military version of these drones has definitely changed the strategic approach taken by military leadership in the war on terror. Loss of life has been a tragic cost of making war since the dawn of time, and the cost went way up with the invention and application of complex military aircraft. With drones, the loss of the pilot and flight crew is not a loss that needs to be weighed in decision making for specific missions, or even entering entire conflicts.
Their integration into military operations has been relatively efficient, with a handful of setbacks along the way. The initial problems came with world wide satellite connectivity and the response of the drone to the loss there of. After some initial crashes, computer programming alleviated the problem with automatic RTB programs installed prior to the drones taking off. This allowed the drones to come home and land automatically if connectivity never gets restored (if the antenna is shot off for example). The worst part of this problem is the drone being programmed to climb in an attempt to regain the signal. The drones I flew next too would climb directly through anything and everything flying above it, without question of collision avoidance. That could not be an option for drones in the US NAS.
I was a part of a special program that was thrown together to fight the opposite side of the efficiency coin, and that was the fact that they couldn't build drones fast enough to meet war-fighters needs on the ground in Afghanistan from 2009 until the current draw-down. The cost and manufacturing process was too high, slow, and complex, so the military slapped together some MC-12W's (Beechcraft King Air 350 ER's) to fill the void in airborne intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) until that process was more streamlined.
Ethically speaking, I don't believe the strategy has changed. Collateral damage has been another sad cost of war, and will continue to be far into the future. Manned coalition aircraft have been as much or more of an issue than drones have been in this facet, including accidental friendly fire situations like the one from F-15's on Canadian ground forces. There is only so much intelligence you can gather and restrictions you can set on when an aircraft can fire before the war effort becomes futile and far too expensive to keep up.
(4)I found a link to a job opportunity with Northrop Grumman as an RPV pilot, as found here:
https://ngc.taleo.net/careersection/ngc_pro/jobdetail.ftl?job=15004153&lang=en
References:
AC 91-57A. (2015, September 2). Retrieved October 5, 2015, from
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_91-57A.pdf
Handwerk, B. (2013, December 2). 5 Surprising Drone Uses (Besides Amazon Delivery). Retrieved
October 5, 2015, from http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/12/131202-drone-uav-uas-
amazon-octocopter-bezos-science-aircraft-unmanned-robot/
UAS Flyer. (n.d.). Retrieved October 2, 2015, from
https://www.faa.gov/uas/publications/media/27231_FAA_UAS_Flyer_lores.pdf
UAS Registration Letter. (n.d.). Retrieved October 5, 2015, from
https://www.faa.gov/uas/regulations_policies/media/Registration_letter.pdf
SUAS Proposed Rule Summary. (n.d.). Retrieved October 5, 2015, from
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/media/021515_sUAS_Summary.pdf
(1) Currently, civilian use of UAS's is restricted to recreational use only, unless they obtain a waiver from the FAA. People that use them in a fashion similar to model aircraft don't need FAA permission to operate them. People can be held liable, however, if they fly over people or in a manner that endangers people, property, or wildlife. The new regulations are being written to provide rules for non-recreational use, or essentially, commercial use. These rules would allow for commercial use in areas that are already permitted by the FAA via a certificate of waiver or authorization (COA), but would be on a certified, permanent basis rather than a case by case basis. The ability to apply for these permits came about with the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FAA, 2015). Currently, companies can use UAS's for things like hurricane hunting, search and rescue, wildlife conservation, and 3-D mapping (Handwerk, 2013). Also, utilizing drones for aeronautical research is permitted, which is what Amazon is doing with the drones they plan to use for commercial shipping operations. Finally, some UAS's are being used for commercial aerial photography or cinematography as well.
The companies that obtain the COA's are expected to follow the guidelines set in advisory circular 91-57A, as well as be registered prior to the application for the COA (FAA, 2015). These guidelines are the baseline for the rules that are supposed to be finalized any day now for future commercial use of drones. In addition to the vague, safety guidelines in the AC, the new rules will impose an altitude limit, speed limit, weight limit, daylight operations only limit, and limits on what weather operators can launch flights into. Other things will include proper registration markings, proper maintenance, and pre-flight inspections of the UAS also. Finally, operators will have to pass an initial aerial knowledge test, obtain an operator certificate and small UAS rating, and provide the ability for the FAA to conduct inspections of the operation. Although these might seem costly and restrictive, the worst part for commercial operations is that the UAS must remain within visual line of sight (VLOS) of the operator. This would most likely prevent Amazon from initiating it's GPS based package delivery system, at least for now.
(2) I do believe we are going to see full integration of not only small UAS's, but full scale remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) as well. The administrator, Michael Huerta, has identified this integration process as a priority item for the FAA over the next few years (FAA, 2015). The current NPRM for commercial use of UAS's is supposed to be passed into law any day now, meaning the initial implementation, with all of the restrictions on speed, weight, and altitude, will be the first step toward full integration. Assuming that we don't see any accidents specifically related to mechanical or electronic signals transmission issues, the next step would be to reduce those limits and allow these vehicles to proceed at altitudes and speeds that could match manned aircraft.
Current programming and GPS navigation systems are already physically capable of beyond VLOS capabilities, including take off, landing/ dropping a parcel, and returning to base (RTB). There are shelf available quad-copters that can even do this. A proper pre-flight inspection to assure the engines run and there is enough battery life for the flight could be the last line of defense before a sightless vehicle completely enters manned airspace on a programmed flight profile. This is how most of the military RPV's operate to and from their area of responsibility, the only difference being they have pilots overseeing the entire process. Another issue would be that of making in flight corrections. The weather can change along the route of flight, VFR manned aircraft could be practicing maneuvers near a "highway" (as proposed by Amazon), and without a direct connection to ATC, changing the flight path of the UAS might not be an option. The remote operators will have an extremely difficult time building a big picture of the operating airspace with out proper communications.
The perception problem coming from the public's eye is going to be extremely similar to that of the commercial space travel issue. The inherent danger, coupled with America's drama driven mass media sources, will be plenty to establish a giant, skeptical public stance against integration above the limitations in the upcoming legislation. Logistical issues will play a part in the defense as well, because ATC is going to have to account for these vehicles and will absolutely need a tool for spacing and collision avoidance between all aircraft in the busiest airspace on Earth. Terrifying stories of crashes and close encounters, like the ones I have from Afghanistan, will provide real world experience instead of just think tank theories. These collisions are an existing problem to the full integration of these vehicles.
(3)The military version of these drones has definitely changed the strategic approach taken by military leadership in the war on terror. Loss of life has been a tragic cost of making war since the dawn of time, and the cost went way up with the invention and application of complex military aircraft. With drones, the loss of the pilot and flight crew is not a loss that needs to be weighed in decision making for specific missions, or even entering entire conflicts.
Their integration into military operations has been relatively efficient, with a handful of setbacks along the way. The initial problems came with world wide satellite connectivity and the response of the drone to the loss there of. After some initial crashes, computer programming alleviated the problem with automatic RTB programs installed prior to the drones taking off. This allowed the drones to come home and land automatically if connectivity never gets restored (if the antenna is shot off for example). The worst part of this problem is the drone being programmed to climb in an attempt to regain the signal. The drones I flew next too would climb directly through anything and everything flying above it, without question of collision avoidance. That could not be an option for drones in the US NAS.
I was a part of a special program that was thrown together to fight the opposite side of the efficiency coin, and that was the fact that they couldn't build drones fast enough to meet war-fighters needs on the ground in Afghanistan from 2009 until the current draw-down. The cost and manufacturing process was too high, slow, and complex, so the military slapped together some MC-12W's (Beechcraft King Air 350 ER's) to fill the void in airborne intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) until that process was more streamlined.
Ethically speaking, I don't believe the strategy has changed. Collateral damage has been another sad cost of war, and will continue to be far into the future. Manned coalition aircraft have been as much or more of an issue than drones have been in this facet, including accidental friendly fire situations like the one from F-15's on Canadian ground forces. There is only so much intelligence you can gather and restrictions you can set on when an aircraft can fire before the war effort becomes futile and far too expensive to keep up.
(4)I found a link to a job opportunity with Northrop Grumman as an RPV pilot, as found here:
https://ngc.taleo.net/careersection/ngc_pro/jobdetail.ftl?job=15004153&lang=en
References:
AC 91-57A. (2015, September 2). Retrieved October 5, 2015, from
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_91-57A.pdf
Handwerk, B. (2013, December 2). 5 Surprising Drone Uses (Besides Amazon Delivery). Retrieved
October 5, 2015, from http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/12/131202-drone-uav-uas-
amazon-octocopter-bezos-science-aircraft-unmanned-robot/
UAS Flyer. (n.d.). Retrieved October 2, 2015, from
https://www.faa.gov/uas/publications/media/27231_FAA_UAS_Flyer_lores.pdf
UAS Registration Letter. (n.d.). Retrieved October 5, 2015, from
https://www.faa.gov/uas/regulations_policies/media/Registration_letter.pdf
SUAS Proposed Rule Summary. (n.d.). Retrieved October 5, 2015, from
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/media/021515_sUAS_Summary.pdf
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