Chinese dependence on COMAC success

            The struggles involving Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) have been well documented since its formation in 2008.  The company is a conglomeration of small Chinese aircraft companies that were purchased and merged by the investment arm of the Chinese government.  COMAC struggled in its infancy, surrounded by similar rumors to that of the Shanghai Y-10 of the 1980’s, and by real-world setbacks that occurred on both of its initial project aircraft (the ARJ-21 regional jet and the C-919 narrow-body airliner).  Despite the initial trouble, COMAC has finally completed certification of its regional jet, and is in the static testing phase for the C-919, a jet that falls into the same class as the airbus A320 and the Boeing 737.  COMAC strongly believes, along with some outside sources, that their jet will compete on a global level with the current Airbus/Boeing duopoly that has the market cornered, even in China right now. 

There are many barriers to bringing a new product to market, from initial costs to company and product efficiency and how well the product is actually going to compete against aircraft that have been a staple in the industry forever.  Due to the heavy regulation of the aerospace industry worldwide, these barriers have ended many companies, and prevented just as many from emerging onto the scene.  Most companies wouldn’t even attempt developing a new aircraft when the initial cost for designing and producing one prototype C919 is around $14 billion (Perrett, 2013).  There is a two-faceted approach to this monstrous cause from the standpoint of COMAC, and especially the Chinese government.

Firstly, the Chinese regional air carrier market is booming.  Including thousands of Boeing, Airbus, and other aircraft already operating for Chinese air carriers, their market is in need of 6,300 aircraft over the next 20 years (Jiang, 2015).  At $68 million apiece (estimated), and 500 orders already “confirmed”, COMAC stands to make an estimated $34 billion within the first few years after CAAC (Civil Aviation Administration of China) certification (Dawei and Dongmei, 2012).  On this front, COMAC and the Chinese government believe they can overcome the design cost and production costs associated with fulfilling its orders.  Furthermore, at or near the $68 million dollar price tag per aircraft would definitely keep the C919 at a cheaper up front purchase price than a Boeing 737MAX ($78-$108 million) and the A320NEO ($71-$120 million) according to Boeing and Airbus website price estimates.  This makes the C919 look pretty competitive, but outside certification from the FAA or the EASA would prevent the plane from being purchased by air carriers outside of motherland China, a topic covered by my earlier blog post.  That lack of certification, along with nasty old rumors about how far behind US technology the Chinese companies are, and it makes you wonder how confirmed some of those initial orders really are. 

Which brings us to the second point.  Chinese air carriers probably don’t mind purchasing aircraft that are already available to fit their needs, but the government wants to lessen China’s dependence upon equipment from the rest of the first world.  It is another attempt to differentiate China as a global leader in technology, independent of the U.S. and its’ stuck up Boeing aircraft.  The rumors that circulate surrounding cheap Chinese labor and the efforts of their engineers and designers were an issue that ruined the Shanghai Y-10.  There were pictures and images of a torn apart Boeing 707 that supposedly confirmed that the Y-10 was reverse engineered from the 707.  That rumor was later squashed by Boeing and the designers from Shanghai Aviation Industrial Company (SAIC), but it wouldn’t prove to be enough to launch the aircraft into full scale production (Gordon and Komissarov, 2008).  These issues continued to hamper the efforts of COMAC’s ARJ21 as well, even though they continually hit rough patches where the CAAC was holding COMAC to very high standards of quality control before allowing the jet to proceed through testing and certification.  The same could be said of the C919, which hit major setbacks from weak raw materials and design aspects from Chinese companies and engineers that were flat out not going to make the cut.  These issues forced COMAC to bring in a host of foreign engineers, and it caused them to look at outfitting the C919 with a lot of systems from western aircraft (Jiang, 2015). 

The Chinese government is actually using these facts to try to bolster global support for COMAC and its future endeavors.  It shows their desire to meet standards that would make global consumers happy, profitable, and ultimately safe.  The aircraft, and their future designs, will continue to be called indigenously Chinese designs, regardless of the American fuel system and avionics package, and COMAC will be regarded for the level of safety and efficiency the jets achieve (if they do achieve anything to be heralded for).  This is another reason the Chinese government will continue to throw money at COMAC even if it takes far longer than expected (or hoped) for western approval of CAAC’s certification processes. 

The emotional drive behind the government and its policies relating to COMAC and Chinese built aircraft is extraordinarily strong.  Idea’s surrounding an independent China date back to the end of WWI, when the country was divided into territories and was governed by mostly by occupying countries.  Marxism and anti-west political figures took over and it took almost 50 years and multiple political “rearrangements” for Chinese markets to really open up to trade with the west (mainly the United States).  The pride associated with their independence is still very strong, even with globalization and today’s trade principals.  Further, modern aircraft are the epitome of technological advancement due to advanced aircraft capabilities, standards regarding public safety, and mass media coverage surrounding outstanding accomplishments and failures of this industry.  That is why China wants the world to measure its success based on COMAC’s accomplishments next to giants like Boeing and Airbus, and will continue to back their aviation projects until the rest of the world does approve, or the entire system comes crashing down. 

References:

Dawei, Y., & Dongmei, L. (2012, December 12). Comac C919 Airliner Project Flying in the Dark. Retrieved December 16, 2015, from http://english.caixin.com/2012-12-18/100474031.html

Gordon, E., & Komissarov, D. (2008). Chinese aircraft: China's aviation industry since 1951. Manchester, England: Hikoki Publications.

Jiang, S. (2015, November 2). China takes on Boeing, Airbus with new passenger jet - CNN.com.Retrieved November 7, 2015, from http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/02/asia/china-new-c919-passenger-jet/

Leighton, B. (2015, March 18). A Closer Look at the Comac C919 - Why Does it Exist? -AirlineReporter. Retrieved November 7, 2015, from http://www.airlinereporter.com/2015/03/ closer-look-comac-c919-exist/

Perrett, B. (2013, December 16). C919 May Be Largely Limited To Chinese Market. RetrievedNovember 7, 2015, from http://aviationweek.com/awin/c919-may-be-largely-limited-chinese-market

ATC privatization

     (1) The biggest reason GA is fighting the privatization of air traffic control is cash money.  Money drives everything in the industry, and is the primary reason the FAA is pushing for privatization in the first place.  GA is concerned that the majority of its participants (schools, students, weekend flyers) won't be able to pay user fees associated with funding of privately owned control facilities, an issue that GA specifically has been fighting for over a decade (Wood, 2015).  A secondary issue is that airlines and business aviation, that could afford user fees, would gain priority over general aviation users because they would add to air traffic control companies' profitability.  GA typically gives most of the right of way to faster moving traffic anyway, but GA officials fear this would make it typical on behalf of the controllers, with little or no say (barring emergencies) from pilots.

     (2) The airlines are on board for a couple of reasons, and with stipulations.  They don't want ATC to be for profit, because it would cause more issues in the system as far as what the facilities are spending their money on, which is the same issue the FAA is having now.  Airlines do, however, believe privatization could make the push for the National Airspace Revitalization Plan 2002 to become a reality, one that the industry needs desperately with growing air traffic and a shrinking control infrastructure.  Although it's still monetarily driven, the new system would allow airlines to choose the most optimized routes possible, saving billions of dollars in operating expenses, which is why some airlines are now saying we should give privatization a shot (Jansen, 2015).

     (3) There are a number of other countries that are currently employing a privatized ATC system.  Some of them are Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, France, Germany, and the UK, all first world countries with thriving aviation industries.  There is a varying degree of government control, however, similar to the government "control" over the middle eastern airlines.  Also in similar fashion, those ATC facilities run on their own revenue stream, and they make their own decisions as to how and what they spend their money on.  The bottom line for them is they are absolutely as safe and as efficient as our system.  Furthermore,  New Zealand swung from losing $10 million per year on their ATC system, to profiting $4.2 million per year after they switched to private ATC (Adams, 2005).

     (4) Congress would have to pass laws that would direct the FAA to set rules and regulations regarding what the ATC companies needed to do to maintain safety, as well as all the programs necessary to evaluate them and ensure they aren't endangering the flying public.  After that, the FAA would write the FAR's necessary and establish all their oversight programs and contacts at individual FSDO's.  The whole process could take years to finalize in our system, even longer if the fight over whether or not it's the right thing to do is carried heavily on both sides.

     (5) I believe the system would be more efficient.  Capitalism has already demonstrated companies abilities to make unbelievable amounts of money.  That being said, it has also showed, undeniably, that the people running corporations making that kind of money only do it for one thing; and that is to make that kind of money.  So many have gone to jail for ripping people off and editing the books, and if that happened in this industry, we wouldn't realize it until we had another massive disaster killing hundreds of people on a Delta airliner (for example).  I'm not convinced the ATC system itself would be safer between the time private companies took over the current system and the time that the future surveillance system is fully functioning (ADS-B and data-link communications, etc.).  Once that system is established and the airlines are operating in a "free flight" type of environment, I believe privatization won't have such a greedy impact on safety because the safety is far more controlled by the PIC's and the operations folks at the airline level.  It's a tough debate though, because without privatizing ATC and allowing them to make some kind of money, that system might continue to be pushed back and not implemented until we're already retired.

References:

Jansen, B. (2015, December 2). Call to action issued over ATC privatization. Retrieved December 7,      2015.  Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/12/01/airline-executives-urge-
     privatization-air-traffic-control/76604766/

Wood, J. (2015, July 8). Call to action issued over ATC privatization. Retrieved December 7, 2015.
     Retrieved from http://generalaviationnews.com/2015/07/08/call-to-action-issued-over-atc-  
     privatization/

GA medical reform

     (1) The agenda for GA medical reform is the same agenda that AOPA and the general aviation community has had for many years.  The difference today is the movement has finally obtained some traction in and around Washington.  After pushing the issue for over ten years, the house and senate have introduced the "Pilot's bill of rights 2", a set of rules designed to protect pilots flying for public interest, representatives of the FAA, and pilots that risk losing their freedom to fly based on outdated medical requirements (Tennyson, 2015).  AOPA has a list of senators and state representatives from both parties that have endorsed these changes, and is very confident that the changes will go through.
     (2)Currently, the pilot's bill of rights 2 is a bill that is being mulled over by the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee.  The committee will vote on the laws, as well as possible amendments to the laws, and once it passes (if it passes?) the house and senate will vote on passing the bill into legislation (Tennyson, 2015).  If it passes through congress, the president will then have to sign the bill to make it officially legal legislation.  Then, the administrator will follow the letters of the laws to write proper regulations (or amend regulations) into the FAR's for the aviation community to follow accordingly.

     (3)In my opinion, the biggest aspect to the new rules would be the financial impact.  I will say, though, that that is a sad statement considering the rules are being built around an individuals health and its effect on public safety.  Low balling the estimate, the FAA alone stands to save at least $2.49 million each year by cutting out the processes associated with approving third class medicals.  Furthermore, pilots will save around $20 million nation wide, all of which would likely be put directly back into the industry which provides about $219 billion to the U.S. economy each year (Stanley, 2015).  The negative side of this aspect is the small likelihood that someone operating an aircraft in an unsafe manor (after smoking marijuana or losing his mental stability), and you "can't put a price tag on the public safety".  There are some senators, as well as members of the NTSB that are so afraid of this that they will fight for the third class medical until the president signs off on it.  I would say that I agree that safety shouldn't have a price tag that's too far out of reach. However, safety has never been effected by individuals with expired or non-existent medical forms, meaning no aviation accident in the NTSB archive was caused by a pilot (or otherwise) that was flying on an expired or non-existent medical certificate.  Furthermore, there are multiple instances where non-pilots and co-pilots, from general aviation all the way up to 121 major carriers, were forced to land an aircraft because the pilot flying became incapacitated or died while flying with a current and valid medical certificate.  Even the germanwings pilot voids this argument, as he was an individual who did report his issues, who was documented as possibly suspect, and he was still allowed to fly his passengers into the Alps.  Something as simple as a third class medical screening is not going to prevent things like this from happening, but it will prevent many thousands of ageing pilots and upcoming hopeful's from experiencing the love of flight due to minor health problems that have no consequence on their flying.

     (4)I believe that reform is necessary because too many people are being turned away from a slowly dying industry that used to be so beautiful when thriving.  With manufacturing costs skyrocketing from regulations and fuel prices costing more than quality draft beer at high priced bars,  its difficult enough to fly for those of us who can easily pass the current medical requirements.  We need all the income we can get at FBO's and public use airports by allowing as many people as possible to fly, especially those with the means and the passion who might be just a bit older or a bit heavier than the rest of us.


References:

Stanely, C. (2015, February 28). The FAA and NTSB vs. Common Sense: Part Deux. Retrieved
     December 1, 2015, from http://jonathanturley.org/2015/02/28/the-faa-and-ntsb-vs-common-
     sense- part-deux/

Tennyson, E. (2015, November 18). Closer than ever. Retrieved December 1, 2015, from
     http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2015/November/18/Closer-than-ever

Made in China

     (1) Similarly to all aspects surrounding COMAC's C919, the FAA approval is more likely an issue of when vs an issue of whether or not.  I believe it's just a matter of time until the one of the western aviation authorites (FAA or EASA) will provide it's airworthiness approval to COMAC as long as it manages to obtain a type certificate from the Civil Aviation Administration of China.  There are reports that claim the CAAC is actually a lot tougher on its manufacturers than the FAA is in America (Perrett, 2013).  However, the FAA has its doubts about CAAC based on COMAC's earlier aviation expeditions, the ARJ21.  Now that the ARJ21 has finished its certification process (6 years late), as long as the jet itself doesn't kill anyone, the FAA might start to recognize the legitimacy of the CAAC.  That process, or rather its timeline, would have potential to end the C919 if it were banking singularly on international sales.  The Chinese aviation market has potential by itself to use up to 1,000 C919's in several of its own airlines.  Between that and the government backing, COMAC might stay around long enough for the C919 to prove itself as an efficient competitor to the A320, if not the B737, and could have some financial demand coming from other European customers, leading to western certification and potentially FAA certification as well.

     (2)The biggest issue for carriers in the US would be establishing a training pipeline that is certified by the FAA.  If that would cost to much, they could just outsource it to China! With some translation issues and language barriers, it could be cheaper to send US pilots abroad for the training program that was established by and certified in China.  The quality of pilots shouldn't decline, considering most of them selected for that position should've been raised under the FAA's guise in the private pilot, commercial pilot, and initial 121 or 135 operation phases.  As far as purchasing aircraft, the FAA's decision on whether or not to certify (or allow CAAC certification) is the biggest hindrance.  From a public relation standpoint, the aviation bloggers at CNN say "we will fly on the C919 as soon as it becomes China's 'Air Force One'" (Jiang, 2015).  There was skepticism in the beginning when COMAC announced plans to use composites on an airliner, the first of this capacity to ever do so.  The criticism was fueled further when they rejected the initial batch of composite material because it failed to meet the requirements set by the engineers.  Furthermore, other Chinese airliners have been called "death traps" by western press (Leighton, 2015).  I think its safe to say that from a public perception standpoint, the Chinese are taking on a monstrous endeavor, putting it lightly.  For US carriers, that monster is even greater because its their media and their regular customers that are making the negative noise surrounding this project.  Lastly, US carriers would be taking a small jab in the direction of Boeing's face if they were to begin purchasing these jets, another monster in the industry that could have an influence on the flying public as well.

     (3)COMAC has a great relationship with its airlines because the Chinese aviation market is growing extremely rapidly.  The Chinese recently committed to purchasing $38 billion in Boeing aircraft, and another $17 billion in Airbus aircraft to try to meet its flying demands.  COMAC is also a division of the Chinese government, specifically Avic, which builds Airbus wings to the French company's high appreciation (Perrett, 2013).  Furthermore, COMAC is a section of the Chinese government that is actively trying to assert itself as a technological powerhouse (Perrett, 2013).  With their booming economy, the financial backing won't ever go away, even if the C919 is a long run flop.  This brings us to the future of COMAC, the C929 and C939.  These are twin engine, twin aisle, widebody aircraft that are supposed to seat 300 and 400 people each.  With the delays and focus on the C919 (and how long it's been delayed), there is no time frame set on even developing these aircraft.  COMAC's Russian counterpart, UAC, claims that they'll have these two aircraft in service by 2025, but there aren't many other details available yet (Flottau, 2015).

    (4) I think other companies would choose not to get into the love triangle between Boeing, Airbus, and hypothetically COMAC.  The struggle that COMAC is going through and the growing pains it is encountering would be impossible to overcome without the Chinese booming economy and seemingly endless government support.  Further, without an intense gain in technology and materials, it's going to be more and more difficult to squeeze efficiency out of an aircraft in the same categories that the Airbus and Boeing aircraft have the current duopoly on (like the 777 and the A350).  Even the C919 has enough external parts and pieces that its hard to say that it will be as efficient as COMAC claims, since it runs the same engine as the A320 (CFM 56) with an American fuel system (Jiang, 2015).

     (5)The struggles of COMAC have Boeing adding dollars to their own portfolios in the years to come already.  In June, Boeing updated its 20 year forecast for aircraft sales by approximately 12-20 billion dollars above its earlier expectations (Reed, 2015).  With Airbus and Boeing splitting the widebody market at almost exactly 50-50, and only a 2.2 percent increase in domestic air travel over the next few years, the biggest buyer of Boeing aircraft is going to be the Chinese aviation industry. They made these predictions shortly after another delay in the manufacturing process of the C919.  I haven't found much from Airbus, but one of their officials say they couldn't see the C919 entering service in China until 2020, basically meaning that it's not something they have on their radar as an upcoming issue at all.

References:

 Flottau, J. (2015, June 16). UAC, Comac To Define Widebody Aircraft By September. Retrieved
     November 7, 2015, from http://aviationweek.com/paris-air-show-2015/uac-comac-define-
     widebody-aircraft-september

Jiang, S. (2015, November 2). China takes on Boeing, Airbus with new passenger jet - CNN.com.
     Retrieved November 7, 2015, from http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/02/asia/china-new-c919-
     passenger-jet/

Leighton, B. (2015, March 18). A Closer Look at the Comac C919 - Why Does it Exist? -
     AirlineReporter. Retrieved November 7, 2015, from http://www.airlinereporter.com/2015/03/ 
     closer-look-comac-c919-exist/

Perrett, B. (2013, December 16). C919 May Be Largely Limited To Chinese Market. Retrieved
     November 7, 2015, from http://aviationweek.com/awin/c919-may-be-largely-limited-chinese-
     market

Reed, D. (2015, June 12). Thanks, China: Boeing Gleefully Increases Forecast For Jetliner Sales To
     $5.6 Trillion. Retrieved November 7, 2015, from http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielreed/ 
     2015/06/12/thanks-china-boeing-gleefully-increases-forecast-for-jetliner-sales-to-5-6-trillion/

AOPA, NBAA, ALPA, and the boys.

     (1) There are many organizations that have been established over the years that provide benefits to members of the aviation world.  Some of the most famous ones are the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA) and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) for general aviation.  Others exist for aircraft mechanics, airline pilots, and business aviation departments too.  Just about anybody with an aviation career can find an organization that provides its members with something beneficial and exciting, even if sometimes its for a fee.  As a pilot, the AOPA and the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA) are two that I think will be important for me to belong to as a corporate aviator.

     (2) The mission of AOPA is to protect the freedom of the American people to participate in aviation.  They do this by:

• advocating on behalf of our members,
• educating pilots, nonpilots, and policy makers alike,
• supporting activities that ensure the long-term health of General Aviation,
• fighting to keep General Aviation accessible to all, and
• securing sufficient resources to ensure our success (AOPA, n.d.)

     The NBAA's mission is "to foster an environment that allows business aviation to thrive in the United States and around the world" (NBAA, n.d.).  The Association represents more than 10,000 companies and provides more than 100 products and services to the business aviation community, including the NBAA Business Aviation Convention & Exhibition, the world's largest civil aviation trade show (NBAA, n.d.).  

     (3).  AOPA uses information that has been compiled since 1939 to educate pilots (or non-pilots) about aircraft, safety, and how to get into flying.  They are always lobbying against restrictions on the general aviation community that make it more expensive or more restrictive on people that want to get started.  They've lobbied for radio frequencies, to stop president Nixon from "raiding" the aviation trust fund, and to prevent restrictions on general aviation flying during the oil embargo of the 1970's (AOPA, n.d.).  

     NBAA realized a need for representing a united business aircraft front in all matters where organized action became necessary to improve aircraft, equipment, and service; and furthering the cause of safety and economy of business aircraft operations (NBAA, n.d.).  They use information gathered from the companies they represent and their aviation departments to promote development of safer and more efficient technology.  Their yearly conference puts these new ideas on display for the business world to see.  There is a huge sum of money wrapped up in the research and development for the jets and their equipment, but the NBAA promotes this innovation by demonstrating the profitability that can be purchased through proper utilization of an aviation department for businesses.  

     (4) AOPA is a strong organization that is important to become a part of because it's mission is the centralized idea for all aviation enthusiasts from the bottom to the top.  Without somebody to represent the community, the government could provide undisputed arguments to apply extra taxes to aviation fuel, provide manufacturers with even more costly policies for manufacturing aircraft, and they could further limit the number or type of people that are allowed to become pilots to a degree that would cost the industry dearly.  The big airlines, that the government has no problem bailing out of bankruptcy, wouldn't have even remotely enough pilots to keep up with the demand of the flying public if it weren't for general aviation giving pilots the opportunity to train and fly in small, civil aircraft.  They government has no problem attempting to stop general aviation during times of oil crisis though, despite general aviation having 98% of all aircraft and only using 8.6% of civil aviation fuels (while 91.4% is used by the airlines) (AOPA, n.d.).

    

     NBAA does a great job bringing businesses into the world of aviation.  It's a difficult decision for a company to make because the price of creating and running a flight department is astronomical compared to most companies regular day to day operations.  That being said, the stress relieved by avoiding part 121 operation airports and schedules has provided immeasurable profits for companies that can move their executives all over the country on their own time.  People have the ability to show up to meetings in California rested and prepared from New York, and return the same day or the next day while traveling in extreme comfort.  These operations, though, are hard to maintain.  Many corporate pilots have been woke up by phone calls from the company saying the flight department is too expensive, and they are no longer employed.  It is important to be a member of the NBAA because they provide companies with resources to attempt to prevent things like this from happening.  In fact, they offer over 100 products and services to member companies including heavily discounted or free advertising and links to their websites from the NBAA website.  They also keep tabs on the industry, fight for regulatory actions that make sense for safety and the economy, and even for the environment.  The information they have keeps their members up to date on issues that could cause disaster industry wide, potentially, and they keep them informed on ways to make their voices heard.  They even have assessments for pilots and other department members to provide feedback on the living environment and the monetary compensation they're getting so they can make decisions as to whether or not their own departments should be changed, which is a huge reason to be a member for myself when just getting started in a few years.

References:

About NBAA. (n.d.). Retrieved October 31, 2015, from https://www.nbaa.org/about/

Mission and History of AOPA. (n.d.). Retrieved October 31, 2015, from
     http://www.aopa.org/AboutAOPA/Governance/Mission-and-History-of-AOPA

Fairness of Global Airlines

     (1)There are a multitude of airlines that receive massive amount of government aid in order to maintain their operations.  There are three that are being accused, by a group of American based airlines, of taking an unfair advantage of these subsidies to continue operating with prices and services that other airlines can't compete with.  Etihad, Emirates, and Qatar airlines are all under fire for potentially violating the Open Skies agreement that governs international airline competition. Etihad airlines is based near Abu Dhabi international airport and is the second largest airport in the United Arab Emirates, behind Emirates Airlines.  Both of those two are government owned air carriers that are allowed to fly to and from American cities for international air travel competition.  Qatar airlines is owned by the Qatari government and provides flights to and from Doha, as well as to other parts of India, Asia, and Africa.  They all receive subsidies such as fuel hedges, interest free loans, and cheap landing fees in their home airports (Yglesias, 2015).

     (2)In the past, the big three legacy airlines (Delta, American, and United) have taken "subsidies" from the US government too.  The vast majority of these came after 9/11, in the form of interest free loans and debt relief from chapter 11 bankruptcy, which they were allowed to file when the industry all but crashed after the terrorist attacks.  While it seems like comparing apples to oranges, this is one of the counter arguments based on a study funded by Etihad, who claims that this is proof that the legacy airlines play ball the same way they do (US Carriers, 2015).  The study claims the US carriers have received as much as $71.5 Billion.  Specifically, it cites:

$761 million was granted to Delta by Minnesota to build a fleet maintenance facility
$80-85 million received by American Airlines for redevelopment funds from Missouri in 2003
$6.3 million received by United Airlines in tax credits from Colorado

     (3)The secondary claim that the foreign long haul carriers have had access to "cheaper than market value" aircraft comes from an excessive use of the US export-import bank.  The US export-import bank is an institution established by the government that gives loans to countries or firms that wouldn't have easy access to capital by other means, in order for those countries or firms to purchase US made tools or equipment (Bhaskara, 2014).  The complaint by the legacy airlines stems from the excessive purchases made through the export-import bank by Emirates, Etihad, and Qatar airlines, all of whom have relatively easy access to capital through regular commercial lending institutions.  They have purchased more Boeing aircraft than any other airlines in the world, including our own, and they've used over $3 billion each in export-import authorizations between 2004 and 2013 (Bhaskara, 2014).  This is an over use of the export-import bank by companies that are more than qualified to get loans at commercial interest rates, and it's a form of US government subsidized money that's given directly to US based airline's competition.

     (4)From the viewpoint of a capitalist, it's hard to say what's fair and what isn't.  If your company has a capability of turning a profit, that's all that really matters and you are free to go for everything you can get away with.  As an American, it's terrible practice to give foreign competition better access than our own industry professionals to top notch American equipment.  It is true that American, Delta, or United can't provide the same services for a better or equal price when the middle east airlines are getting a steal of deal on gas and airport fees, meaning travelers are going to spend their money with the companies that can provide the better deal.  It is estimated that each time a flight is lost to competition this way, the legacy airlines lose up to 800 American jobs (U.S. airlines, n.d.).  That shouldn't be acceptable, regardless of what air travelers want.  Travelers are either vacationing with extra money they've already earned in some other career field that's not affected by this issue, or their traveling on company money for business.  Limiting their options for travel doesn't equate to a single grain of rice on the scale to me.  Losing jobs that are supposed to be middle class and family supportive by selling out to the competition is heart breaking, and we shouldn't be allowing it to happen to our own countrymen.

     That being said, the situation gets more complex because cutting off the export-import access throws Boeing under the bus as a manufacturer.  Therefore, the only option might be to cut off the access given to the middle east airlines by the open skies agreement, the opposite of what the legacy airlines claim that they're trying to do, and the opposite of what being fair means.

References:

Bhaskara, V. (2014, September 2). The Fight Over the Export-Import Bank Has No Easy Answers.
     Retrieved October 22, 2015, from http://www.forbes.com/sites/airchive/2014/09/02/the-fight-
     over-the-export-import-bank-has-no-easy-answers/

Noakes, G. (2015, May 15). US carriers 'have received $71.5 billion in state-aid' - Business Traveller.
     Retrieved October 22, 2015, from http://www.businesstraveller.com/news/101647/us-carriers-
     have-received-dollar-71.5bn-in-stat

U.S. airlines, unions reveal evidence of $42 billion in subsidies. (n.d.). Retrieved October 22, 2015,
     from http://www.openandfairskies.com/press-releases/u-s-airlines-unions-reveal-evidence-of-42-
     billion/

Yglesias, M. (2015, March 27). America's biggest airlines are accusing Persian Gulf carriers of
     cheating. Retrieved October 22, 2015, from http://www.vox.com/2015/3/27/8296495/gulf-airline-
     subsidies

Flight duty hours and Cargo Ops

     (1) The Colgan accident is considered a watershed accident for regional airline operations in the US.  That accident pointed out numerous issues with the industry that we could no longer go on ignoring.  One of those issues was that of pilot fatigue.  The old regulations only limited schedulers to giving pilots 8 hours off between up to 16 hour duty periods (Boxer, 2015).  The legislation passed after this accident now requires a scientific based 10 hour rest period for pilots, as well as a duty day maximum of 9-14 hours depending on number of legs flown and the time of day the crew shows up for work (FAA, 2011).  The pilot's commute to work is still not a consideration for interrupting the rest period or counting for duty time.
     A second issue that was approached was flight training standards.  The FAA has mandated specific simulator training for loss of control events following the Colgan captain's failure to prevent and recover from a stall.  These situations were typically covered in simulator training programs, but they weren't specifically legislated to be taught or taught a certain way or number of times.  The FAA also passed the notorious "1500 hour" rule as a result of this accident.  This rule requires part 121 operators to hire pilots that have at least 1500 total hours, whereas the old legal minimum was 250 hours, 23 years of age, commercial certificate with instrument rating (Tumulty, 2014).  There are some exceptions, such as part 141 certified 4 year college programs and military pilots, who can be hired at 1,000 and 750 hours, respectively.
     The last rule that was updated was a result of the crash victims families from the Colgan accident, and that was a requirement for airlines to specifically disclose code-sharing agreements when their flights were being operated by their regional underlings (Tumulty, 2014).  The families demonstrated that they expected Continental safety and Continental training, only to find out after this accident that there is a major gap between regional and major operators.
     (2) Currently, the requirement for cargo pilots to be hired is set by company minimums.  The old rule of 250 hours, commercial license with instrument rating, 23 year old, would have applied until the new regulations were released, I believe.  Furthermore, these pilots only have to be given a rest period of 8 hours (from the time they shut the aircraft down, not the time they get home or in bed) and they can be flown up to as much as a 16 hour duty day.
     (3) I believe the biggest factor in the exemption is cold, hard, cash money.  The preamble to the final rule goes extensively into the cost to benefit ratios for operators, stating that public safety is well worth the $135 million (at least) that operators will spend on training program improvements for pilots that want ATP's under the new regulations.  It states how operators will make up for these costs, but they specifically refer to part 121, 135, and 91 operators.  The cargo operators, especially larger ones like Fed Ex, have spent over $140 million dollars on political lobbying since Obama took the presidential office (Goelz, & Hall 2014).  The cargo carriers were included in the new crew rest rules NPRM, but were stricken from the final rule most likely due to lobbying that costs would outweigh benefits and would put some carriers out of business altogether.
     (4) I do believe these carriers should be included in the new rules.  Fatigue has been an issue for a very long time, and it applies to all humans regardless of what plane they fly.  The new rules aren't created in Oklahoma to make activists happy (in this case), they're based on scientific evidence concerning our circadian rhythms and sleep cycles.  Cargo pilots fly fast, massive jets identical to those of passenger carriers, just as capable of destroying property and killing people on the ground when mistakes are made while flying fatigued.  As far as the 1500 hour rule, I don't think that one should be applied to any airline in the manner that it is being applied.  The Colgan pilots were far beyond 1500 hours, and even more important, they both had over 1,000 hours of turbine time.  They are a perfect example of why training and tracking competency is far more important than total time, and I'm not really sure why the FAA followed through on this requirement.
     (5) From a pilot perspective, the new rules being applied to the cargo operators would limit the opportunities for me to get into a turbine powered aircraft earlier than 1500 hours.  Currently, the cargo operators provide a good path to airline flying by allowing pilots in at company minimums and paying far better than what a flight school pays its instructors.  For me personally, this would make a huge difference because I have a family of 4 to provide for, rather than just myself.  Furthermore, if companies were to go out of business because of the crew rest requirements, this means there are less job opportunities no matter how many hours you have.  The industry is doing great at the moment, so this probably wouldn't make a huge issue for most of us. If the new rules were to put us back into the '90's, as far as difficulty in getting a pilot job is concerned, those positions in a cargo outfit could be instrumental in a pilot's ability to initiate and complete a career in aviation.

References:

Hall, J., & Goelz, P. (2014, September 11). Cargo pilot hours should be regulated, too: Column.
     Retrieved October 18, 2015, from http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/09/11/cargo-
     pilot-airline-safety-fatigue-regulations-commercial-column/15474061/

Legislation would extend rest requirements to cargo pilots. (2015, June 24). Retrieved October 18,
     2015, from http://www.safetyandhealthmagazine.com/articles/12556-legislation-would-extend-
     rest-requirements-to-cargo-pilots

Press Release – FAA Issues Final Rule on Pilot Fatigue. (2011, December 21). Retrieved October 18,
     2015, from https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=13272

Tumulty, B. (2014, February 11). 5 years after N.Y. crash, some airline safety progress. Retrieved
     October 18, 2015, from http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/02/11/colgan-air-crash-
     prompts-safety-regulations/5372353/

Flying Cheap

     The buzz around the regional industry is a good one from the standpoint of an aviation student who is legitimately targeting a career in the airline industry.  We've had two meetings over the last year with two different regional carriers at Eagle Flight, both of which were encouraging to students because the focus was on the hiring process and what to do for the interviews.  There was never a thought of we won't take people because we're full right now, and the attrition rate in training is minimal because the hiring process is supposed to weed out weak candidates.  Endeavor planned on hiring 30 people every 30 days for the foreseeable future, even out to 4 years from now.  This buzz seemingly represents the need for pilots right at the regional level.  This argument is a multi-headed one I believe, and Endeavor also represented the side of the ALPA by showing us their Delta gateway program and signing bonus that they've implemented to battle the argument for higher pilot wages.

    According to the ALPA, there are tens of thousands of pilots that would could qualify as regional first officers based on the new regulations, ATP requirements, and their current medical certificates.  In my opinion, they're including a decent handful of people that have no desire to be an airline pilot.  These estimates include guys with 135 jobs, career instructors, and life long GA pilots that happen to be over or close to 1500 total hours.  When you subtract those numbers, I personally doubt that number is in the tens of thousands area.  Furthermore, I believe some of those people wouldn't make it through the interview process, no matter how badly the regional's need pilots.  In agreement with the ALPA, however, I believe a number of these candidates would be further attracted to a regional job with the perks that ALPA says are the cause of the pilot shortage itself, as it were.  ALPA claims that unless we work to make the airline pilot profession an attractive career, providing livable wage, benefits, and career-progression opportunities, we will for sure be faced with a shortage of qualified pilots (ALPA, 2015).

     The other side of the coin comes directly from the regional airlines themselves.  Carriers like Republic Airways Holdings complain because they've had to cut down flights, which has cut down their stock prices, because they can't hire enough pilots to fly all their lines (Schmertz, 2015).  Others, like Hopscotch Air, Endeavor, and Trans States, are realizing their business models have to change to incorporate a culture and wages that aspiring pilots will desire (Schmertz, 2015).  A lot of carriers are blaming the FAA requirements for minimums of 1500 hours (with exceptions) to enter training to fill a pilot position with these regional carriers (Jansen, 2015).  Those, in conjunction with the mandatory retirement age set by the FAA, have the regional's losing pilots from their top tier to the majors and they can't fill from the bottom, a lose-lose situation according to carriers.

   The ALPA says the FAA’s new first officer qualification rules were not intended to, and cannot, address the airline industry’s broken business model as it relates to regional air carrier operations and profitability (ALPA, 2015).  The broken business model they're referring to is the one regional carriers use to make money.  The advanced aircraft they fly and the short distances they fly them mean the variable operating expenses they face are relatively high.  They have the same cost of maintenance as any 121 operator, but they have to take all that on at their own level since the major airlines only help them out as far as painting major's paint schemes on the regional's planes and boarding passes.  Therefore, they can't afford to pay pilots what some believe pilots should be paid.  In fact, the five lowest paid first year pilots make between 20 and 21 thousand dollars for the first year (ALPA, 2015).

     Other organizations are already well aware of these issues and have addressed them, such as the International Federation of Air Traffic Controller's Association and the National Air Traffic Controller's Association in the US.  Furthermore, companies pay mechanics very well thanks to their representation by the Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association (AMFA).  Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) represents manufacturers in the industry dealings, and the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE), along with IATA, represent management spots and what they have to offer our community also.  ALPA actually addresses paying all these highly skilled professions well on their website, as another point in the broken business model for regional air carriers.

    I do not believe there is sufficient evidence to support the complaints of the regional airlines, even in their fight with congress over the 1500 hour rule.  The government accountability office stated in 2014 that the demand for air travel had not exceeded the supply of new pilots, even though 11/12 regional carriers contacted by USA Today claimed issues of hiring new pilots (Jansen, 2015).  From an aspiring pilots standpoint, I know 90% of the aviation program I'm in can't wait to get in with a regional to begin their path to the majors.  That's approximately 100 candidates right here from EMU.  Also from our standpoint, the 1500 hour rule makes it very difficult for some of us to reach the minimum, and we'd love to see that repealed or at least reduced to some extent.  That would decrease student loan debt, alleviate some of the stress of instructing or trying to find jobs banner towing, and would assist with the problem of getting burnt out in small single engine aircraft to the point where flying is borderline unenjoyable.  There are plenty of pilots hired with with only a few hundred hours that have progressed just fine in the airlines, and the ones that crashed in the Colgan accident had 2,200 and 3,400 hours each.  I believe, as the FAA legislated after that accident, more in depth training would've been a far better solution than the 1500 hour rule.  I firmly believe, for both parties, we need to continue the fight with Washington to reduce that number, although the solution to the pilot shortage itself is going to come from improving regional profitability and providing a decent lifestyle to their pilots, and all their professional personnel.

     The corporate culture that surrounded the pilots of the Colgan accident was one of cheapness, for sure, as the flying cheap documentary points out.  Professionalism, to me, is being the best at what you do.  This means maintaining all the situational awareness you can on mission, honing your physical and mental skills to be more efficient and precise with decisions and movements, and doing everything it takes to accomplish that mission.  Our mission as pilots, with the FAA's proactive safe culture, is to get our passengers and crew from pint A to point B as safely as possible.
   
     One example from the movie is the addition of a check airman to the new aircraft acquired by Colgan before the buffalo accident.  It is unsafe to put a warm body in a check airman position just to fill a legal requirement so your company can take on routes it's unprepared for in order to increase profitability.  The guy they chose to fill the spot as the guy who makes sure other pilots know their stuff, knew nothing at all about the airplane he was going to be assigned to.  Another premium example is the pressure captains would receive from the Colgan's that had infiltrated their own organization.  The captain in the video said there was a Colgan in every office, and they would tell him they'd find someone else to do the job if he said he wasn't comfortable going.  That pressure comes from guys who've never sat in the front seat of an aircraft and had to make that decision of whether or not to go.  Even with the incredible amount of legislation passed by the FAA over the years, the pilot in command STILL has legal authority to make that decision.
   
     I do believe the tiny compensation for first year, and even fourth and fifth year first officers, is absolutely a contributing factor in the lack of professionalism in the pilots themselves.  They're already subjected to 16 hour days, multiple days away from home, and flying 10 legs a day.  On top of that, they're resting in crash pads with 10 other guys coming and going at all hours, all because they're not paid well enough to rent a place that would be better.  The stress, the amount of training and knowledge required, the level of safety required to be a pilot is incredibly high, and $20,000 a year isn't even close to compensating for that.

     For me to remain professional as a pilot, I'll have to primarily focus on the fact that people have willingly placed their lives in my hands.  Stemming from military experience where people live or die based on my inputs, this is critically embedded in my decision making process.  I believe any person that places a decent value on human life should be concerned with that over all else.  The airplane, your record, or your income wouldn't mean a damn thing to you if your spouse, child, or sibling was put in danger, so why would I be the person subjecting someone else's relative to that danger?  Secondly, the decision for safe operation of the flight always comes back to the pilot in command when the engines are running on his or her airplane.  I will never forget that, and no amount of pressure from a guy type rated in an Ikea mahogany two-tier is going to change that.  There used to be a level of pride associated with being a pilot, and that has seemed to diminish greatly in the world of regional air carriers.  I think that's in part because of the low pay, and lack of straight forward career progression.  People get nervous with the tension that comes with dealing with people like the Colgan's, wanting to keep their jobs and keep moving forward toward a major carrier.  I have to maintain that pride and remember that the decisions are mine, and that they can't fire me over it because its not making them enough family money.  If they do, I'm sure there's some legal action that can be taken since the FAA says its my decision, and not theirs.


References:

ADVANCING AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY SINCE 1931. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12,
     2015, from http://www.alpa.org/advocacy/pilot-pay-shortage

Jansen, B. (2015, August 27). Airline fears of pilot shortage spark Congress fight over required
     training. Retrieved October 10, 2015, from
     http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/27/pilot-shortage-faa-1500-hours-required-colgan-
     crash-alpa/32008451/

Schmertz, A. (2015, September 4). Airlines Complain About Pilot Shortage They Created. Retrieved
     October 12, 2015, from https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/airlines-complain-pilot-shortage-created-
     andrew-schmertz

Young, R. (Director). (2010). Flying cheap [Motion picture]. WGBH Educational Founation.

UAS's place in the National Airspace System

     UAS's (unmanned aerial systems) is a broad term used to describe powered vehicles that fly through the air, controlled by computer programming or remotely located operators.  As technology has increased over the years, these have developed from small, basic radio controlled (RC) airplanes into complex, expensive RC airplanes and into affordable drones such as quadcopters (4 engine helicopter style drones).  The relative simplicity and affordability, coupled with proven technology and military applications, has lead to a recent surge in promoting the integration of certain UAS's into the National Airspace System for commercial purposes.

     (1) Currently, civilian use of UAS's is restricted to recreational use only, unless they obtain a waiver from the FAA.  People that use them in a fashion similar to model aircraft don't need FAA permission to operate them.  People can be held liable, however, if they fly over people or in a manner that endangers people, property, or wildlife.  The new regulations are being written to provide rules for non-recreational use, or essentially, commercial use.  These rules would allow for commercial use in areas that are already permitted by the FAA via a certificate of waiver or authorization (COA), but would be on a certified, permanent basis rather than a case by case basis.  The ability to apply for these permits came about with the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FAA, 2015).  Currently, companies can use UAS's for things like hurricane hunting, search and rescue, wildlife conservation, and 3-D mapping (Handwerk, 2013).  Also, utilizing drones for aeronautical research is permitted, which is what Amazon is doing with the drones they plan to use for commercial shipping operations.  Finally, some UAS's are being used for commercial aerial photography or cinematography as well.
     The companies that obtain the COA's are expected to follow the guidelines set in advisory circular 91-57A, as well as be registered prior to the application for the COA (FAA, 2015).  These guidelines are the baseline for the rules that are supposed to be finalized any day now for future commercial use of drones.  In addition to the vague, safety guidelines in the AC, the new rules will impose an altitude limit, speed limit, weight limit, daylight operations only limit, and limits on what weather operators can launch flights into.  Other things will include proper registration markings, proper maintenance, and pre-flight inspections of the UAS also.  Finally, operators will have to pass an initial aerial knowledge test, obtain an operator certificate and small UAS rating, and provide the ability for the FAA to conduct inspections of the operation.  Although these might seem costly and restrictive, the worst part for commercial operations is that the UAS must remain within visual line of sight (VLOS) of the operator.  This would most likely prevent Amazon from initiating it's GPS based package delivery system, at least for now.

     (2) I do believe we are going to see full integration of not only small UAS's, but full scale remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) as well.  The administrator, Michael Huerta, has identified this integration process as a priority item for the FAA over the next few years (FAA, 2015).  The current NPRM for commercial use of UAS's is supposed to be passed into law any day now, meaning the initial implementation, with all of the restrictions on speed, weight, and altitude, will be the first step toward full integration.  Assuming that we don't see any accidents specifically related to mechanical or electronic signals transmission issues, the next step would be to reduce those limits and allow these vehicles to proceed at altitudes and speeds that could match manned aircraft.
     Current programming and GPS navigation systems are already physically capable of beyond VLOS capabilities, including take off, landing/ dropping a parcel, and returning to base (RTB).  There are shelf available quad-copters that can even do this.  A proper pre-flight inspection to assure the engines run and there is enough battery life for the flight could be the last line of defense before a sightless vehicle completely enters manned airspace on a programmed flight profile.  This is how most of the military RPV's operate to and from their area of responsibility, the only difference being they have pilots overseeing the entire process.  Another issue would be that of making in flight corrections.  The weather can change along the route of flight, VFR manned aircraft could be practicing maneuvers near a "highway" (as proposed by Amazon), and without a direct connection to ATC, changing the flight path of the UAS might not be an option.  The remote operators will have an extremely difficult time building a big picture of the operating airspace with out proper communications.
     The perception problem coming from the public's eye is going to be extremely similar to that of the commercial space travel issue.  The inherent danger, coupled with America's drama driven mass media sources, will be plenty to establish a giant, skeptical public stance against integration above the limitations in the upcoming legislation.  Logistical issues will play a part in the defense as well, because ATC is going to have to account for these vehicles and will absolutely need a tool for spacing and collision avoidance between all aircraft in the busiest airspace on Earth.  Terrifying stories of crashes and close encounters, like the ones I have from Afghanistan, will provide real world experience instead of just think tank theories.  These collisions are an existing problem to the full integration of these vehicles.

     (3)The military version of these drones has definitely changed the strategic approach taken by military leadership in the war on terror.  Loss of life has been a tragic cost of making war since the dawn of time, and the cost went way up with the invention and application of complex military aircraft.  With drones, the loss of the pilot and flight crew is not a loss that needs to be weighed in decision making for specific missions, or even entering entire conflicts.
    Their integration into military operations has been relatively efficient, with a handful of setbacks along the way.  The initial problems came with world wide satellite connectivity and the response of the drone to the loss there of.  After some initial crashes, computer programming alleviated the problem with automatic RTB programs installed prior to the drones taking off.  This allowed the drones to come home and land automatically if connectivity never gets restored (if the antenna is shot off for example).  The worst part of this problem is the drone being programmed to climb in an attempt to regain the signal.  The drones I flew next too would climb directly through anything and everything flying above it, without question of collision avoidance.  That could not be an option for drones in the US NAS.
     I was a part of a special program that was thrown together to fight the opposite side of the efficiency coin, and that was the fact that they couldn't build drones fast enough to meet war-fighters needs on the ground in Afghanistan from 2009 until the current draw-down.  The cost and manufacturing process was too high, slow, and complex, so the military slapped together some MC-12W's (Beechcraft King Air 350 ER's) to fill the void in airborne intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) until that process was more streamlined.
     Ethically speaking, I don't believe the strategy has changed.  Collateral damage has been another sad cost of war, and will continue to be far into the future.  Manned coalition aircraft have been as much or more of an issue than drones have been in this facet, including accidental friendly fire situations like the one from F-15's on Canadian ground forces.  There is only so much intelligence you can gather and restrictions you can set on when an aircraft can fire before the war effort becomes futile and far too expensive to keep up.

     (4)I found a link to a job opportunity with Northrop Grumman as an RPV pilot, as found here:
https://ngc.taleo.net/careersection/ngc_pro/jobdetail.ftl?job=15004153&lang=en

References:

AC 91-57A. (2015, September 2). Retrieved October 5, 2015, from
     http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_91-57A.pdf

Handwerk, B. (2013, December 2). 5 Surprising Drone Uses (Besides Amazon Delivery). Retrieved
     October 5, 2015, from http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/12/131202-drone-uav-uas-
     amazon-octocopter-bezos-science-aircraft-unmanned-robot/

UAS Flyer. (n.d.). Retrieved October 2, 2015, from
     https://www.faa.gov/uas/publications/media/27231_FAA_UAS_Flyer_lores.pdf

UAS Registration Letter. (n.d.). Retrieved October 5, 2015, from
     https://www.faa.gov/uas/regulations_policies/media/Registration_letter.pdf

SUAS Proposed Rule Summary. (n.d.). Retrieved October 5, 2015, from
     https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/media/021515_sUAS_Summary.pdf

Viability of Space Tourism

     I believe the space tourism industry is one that is solidly viable and is only being held up by heavy economic stipulations involved with new spacecraft and attention to the highest level of safety possible.  Currently, we are lacking vehicles that are both economical to operate and reliable enough to lend confidence to public tourists (Bekey, 1998).
     (1)There are written publications that show the idea of space tourism dates back as far as the second century AD.  There are numerous novels written in the 1950's and '60's that explore the ideas of humans occupying and living in space.  Furthermore, television shows and movies such as Star Trek  and Star Wars have given humans visual interpretations of life aboard space craft and even other planets.

     Physical implementations of these ideas peaked with the government space race in the 1960's between the US and the Soviet Union.  The lack of re-usable spacecraft lead to the development of the space shuttle, which completed 135 missions over it's 30 year employment period.  NASA had to extend the space shuttle operation 15 years past what it was designed to do based on the lack of an affordable better option and the need to maintain the international space station (ISS).  Currently, they are working on a multitude of other programs to continue their space flight, but the aerospace community has began to expand to tourism operations and manned commercial cargo operations to the ISS also.   These programs, such as Virgin Galactic's, are still in the process of developing a system that is ready to be used publicly on an every day basis.  They have run into setbacks with funding, legal support, and even catastrophic disasters like the one Virgin experienced on October 31, 2014.  That being said, Virgin has raised over $800 million in deposits from future tourists and they've completed a handful of successful flights prior to their complete mission failure last October.

     (2)The current rules regulating commercial space tourism originated from the Commercial Space Launch  Act of 1984, an act passed by congress giving the Department of Transportation and the FAA's Office of Commercial Space Travel the ability to govern the people and equipment that would partake in space flight.  That act was amended by congress in 2004, in an attempt to govern modern emergence of interest in space tourism for profit.
     In 2006, the FAA released a notice of proposed rule making that included the regulations that are not CFR, title14, chapter III, parts 400-460 (FAA, 2015).  These rules regulate the safety items required on spacecraft and the ports they travel from. The regulations also establish requirements for crew notification, medical qualifications and training, as well as requirements governing environmental control and life support systems (FAA, 2007).  The government has, however, been mostly hands off in the process of building and testing equipment, according to Bloomberg business.  They believe that is going to have to change drastically before people like Richard Branson begin actual flights with paying members of the public on board these spacecraft. The regulations we currently have are that way in order to allow, even encourage, innovation in the face of some risks that we all know come along with human space travel.  I agree with the industry leaders in that further restrictions right now would inhibit that innovation, and I believe it's something we won't just enjoy in the future, but it's something humans are going to need.
   
     (3)The time frame for space travel to become something the public uses is the hardest question to answer.  What I believe we can bank on is the fact that there's profitability in the industry, as well as a negative economic impact domestically when we outsource space travel to other countries (FAA, 2010).  We lose billions in sectors like manufacturing, information, and professional scientific services when commercial space flight is at a low.  These reasons, publicly available via the FAA, will continue to drive public interest in commercial space travel.  I believe currently, it's a one-time bucket list activity, or two times if you've made a personal fortune of billions on Microsoft software.  This is, I believe, one of the initial steps toward every day space flight for colonizing space in the name of human kind.  I do not believe we'll see that until close to the end of our lifetimes, perhaps into the early 2100's, but I really think the science fiction we've seen is going to come to fruition, in some form, around that time.

     (4)Qualifications to work as a pilot are relatively strict.  Virgin Galactic's pilot teams least experienced member has 8,500 flight hours in 90 different aircraft (Virgin Galactic, 2015).  These are pilots that have flown in the military, the space shuttle, and most have degrees or advanced degrees in aerospace engineering.  Some of these pilots have had leadership responsibilities in other organizations, and they've been test pilots on classified aircraft as well.


References:

Bekey, I. (1998, October 2). Space Future - Economically Viable Public Space Travel. Retrieved             September 29, 2015, from
     http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/economically_viable_public_space_travel.shtml

Introducing our Space Pilots - Virgin Galactic. (2015, June 9). Retrieved September 29, 2015, from
     http://www.virgingalactic.com/introducing-our-space-pilots/

Levin, A. (2014, November 7). Space Tourists Treated Like Thrill Seekers in Regulation. Retrieved
     September 29, 2015, from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-07/should-space
     travel-be-like-climbing-everest-or-airlines-

New Regulations Govern Private Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space Flight
     Participants. (2007, February 7). Retrieved September 29, 2015, from
     http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/human_space_flight_reqs/

Office of Commercial Space Transportation. (2015, September 18). Retrieved September 29, 2015,  
     from https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/regulations/

The Economic Impact of Commercial Space Transportation on the U.S. Economy in 2009. (2010,
     September 1). Retrieved September 29, 2015, from
     http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/media/Economic Impact Study September  
     2010_20101026_PS.pdf

Pilots and Depression

     (1)The issue surrounding depression among professional aviators was brought into the limelight following the crash of German wings flight 9525 on March 24, 2015.  The details that emerged over the days following the accident all pointed to an intentional murder-suicide by the pilot, Andreas Lubitz.  Firstly, the cockpit voice recorder, commonly known as "the black box", was found hours after the crash when the first investigation team arrived on the scene (RT, 2015).  It was quickly determined that the co-pilot had locked the captain, and all other flight crew members, outside of the cabin by utilizing the security parameters of the Airbus A320's cockpit door.  The investigators from the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) began an investigation into Lubitz's background over the next two days (Almasy and Spark, 2015).  Their investigation revealed shredded letters from doctors stating that the copilot was unfit for work based on treatment for depression.  Furthermore, the investigators found prescription medications for depression while searching his apartment.  Lufthansa, parent company of German wings, stated they were completely unaware of any medical issues, pointing to the fact that Lubitz had passed his medical examination in 2014 (Almasy and Spark, 2015).

     As the investigation continued to play out, emails were discovered dating back to 2009 that were sent directly to Lufthansa, from Lubitz, stating he had suffered from severe depression and that was the cause of his 18 month hiatus from pilot training (Clark and Kulish, 2015).  The airline allowed him to re-enter training, following the standard initial medical examinations, and placed no extra emphasis on tracking his illness outside of standard aero-medical checks. This was the first indication of past problems associated with his psychosomatic illnesses. A larger red flag should have been established when the American Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) initially denied Lubitz a medical certificate for his training in Arizona (Clark and Kulish, 2015).  The FAA aero-medical team, upon receiving a letter from Lubitz's German psychiatrist claiming complete recovery, ultimately cleared him and issued his medical certificate so he could continue training (Northam, 2015).  The records found in the initial questioning from the FAA medical team showed he was treated for "severe suicidal tendencies", but those were overlooked with the clearance letter from the treating psychiatrist.  The investigation made it clear that Lubitz had failed suicide attempts and denied medical certificates as issues stemming from his illness, all of which was documented.

     (2)There aren't a lot of commercial airline accidents with reports specifically pointing to pilot depression or history of mental illness.  There are, however, a small handful of airline crashes that are easily identified as pilot suicides.  I believe its safe to say that a pilot willing to commit a murder-suicide absolutely has some sort of mental illness, documented or otherwise.  The reason I want to focus more on the commercial side of these accidents is because the potential for loss of life, international media attention, and the passing of some type of legislation is far greater when crashing a 777 into a mountain as compared to a C-172 into a swamp.  A very similar accident was LAM Mozambique Airlines Flight 470.  The accident involved an Embraer 190 that was flown into a Namibian national park intentionally by the captain, Herminio dos Santos Fernandes, in 2013.  The cockpit voice recorder was recovered within 4 days, and just like the German wings recorder, banging could be heard on the cockpit door as alarms went off in the cockpit just prior to the airplane crashing into the ground.  I think this accident is even more perplexing than the previously discussed accident because this pilot was a 9,000 hour captain with no documented mental illnesses, at least according to reports from the Mozambican Civil Aviation Institute (Hradecky, 2013).  Even with slightly less restrictive training programs and medical screening/restrictions, I don't believe this accident would have been less preventable on a Mozambique airlines flight than it would have been on any American airline flight due to the negative impact of self reporting mental illness on our careers here in the United States.

     (3)Pilots have to undergo yearly physical examinations (biennial if they're over 40 and flying for an airline) that typically only examine known ailments that are revealed through self reporting.  Due to the privacy act and laws surrounding Dr./patient relationships, obtaining records without written permission from the person they belong too is almost impossible, barring criminal investigations.  From a pilot's standpoint, this means my employer, or even the FAA, could have no idea what my captain or copilot might be suffering from when I board the airplane with them for a flight.  That's pretty frightening when you think about things that have happened like the accidents above.  I do believe, therefore, that there should be some sort of reform.  That being said, this is America and we place an extremely high regard on our right to privacy, myself included.  I do not believe giving airlines or the FAA unlimited access to medical databases, or any other private information, would be the proper answer.  If a pilot releases their information, then the aero-medical team in Oklahoma can have all the access that goes with that, but they shouldn't have special access above and beyond that.  It is difficult to say if any type of medical reform would be of great assistance, because people can study for and get around mental examinations out of fear of losing their careers.  Also, people are very capable of being fine today, and suffering from PTSD (or something similar) tomorrow, 6 months out from any type of medical exam.  There is far too much gray area in the mental health arena, in my opinion, to believe a solution can come from there alone.

     I believe the reform needs to be based in a system of redundancy involving crew in the cockpit, and perhaps even automated systems to assist in preventing CFIT as a result of intentional acts of a crew member.  For example, the Boeing 757 has a mandatory service bulletin for it's ground proximity warning system to automatically retract the speed brakes when CFIT becomes imminent as a result of the American Airlines Cali, Columbia crash.  That being said, autopilot systems can still be programmed to fly into the ground, and they must be disengaged to initiate a recovery from a deadly flight profile.  Legislating a greater number of people in the cockpit at any time would be a great start to helping prevent these accidents.  Its much harder to program a deadly flight profile with a sane pilot sitting next to you, hand flying the airplane and fist fighting you for the controls.

     (4)It's well known that pilots love to fly, and we love to do so for our jobs.  It's almost always career ending to report something that can negate our medical clearances, mental or physical in nature.  Between that and a pilot's ego, it's hard to self report anything.  If the FAA was to lighten up on the career implications tied to these types of ailments, I believe there would be some level of public fear associated with flying on airliners with potentially ill pilots, which would be way over-inflated by the media coverage surrounding that decision.  From their standpoint, decisions are based around safety, and compromised to benefit air commerce.  The airlines would pitch, extremely vigorously, that the loss of business could be too detrimental, especially to smaller regional airlines.  The answer would have to be a multi-faceted compromise that improves on safety, while having a minimal impact (if any) on airline profitability.  

I do think that with a combination of legislature allowing pilots that are properly medicated to continue flying, more crew members and/or safer cockpit systems, we could prevent further accidents without losing public business.  Knowing there are enough people up front to stop one guy from taking full control would be very comforting, especially following the recent mass media coverage surrounding the German wings flight, and even Malaysia airlines flight 370 not long before that.  This would even allow for someone on medication (or not on their prescribed medication) to maintain his career, barring a criminal attempt at overcoming the safer systems in place.  The airlines might have to pay a small amount in the form of either another pilot or flight engineer for each flight, but I believe that they would find that a far better compromise than scaring off their business if the FAA were to open up to mentally treated pilots, and this is another way they could combat the "pilot shortage" being predicted for our near future.

References

Almasy, S., & Smith-Spark, L. (2015, March 28). Reports: Antidepressants found at Andreas      Lubitz home - CNN.com. Retrieved September 21, 2015.

Hradecky, S. (2013, November 29). Crash: LAM E190 over Botswana/Namibia on Nov 29th      2013, captain intentionally crashed aircraft. Retrieved September 18, 2015.

Kulish, N., & Clark, N. (2015, April 18). Germanwings Crash Exposes History of Denial on Risk of       Pilot Suicide. Retrieved September 21, 2015.

Northam, J. (2015, April 30). Documents Show FAA Questioned Mental Fitness of
     Germanwings Co-Pilot Andreas Lubitz. Retrieved September 18, 2015.

 

Personal Introduction

Hello everybody! 

My name is Kevin Simpson.  I am a flight technology major working on the last couple of flights in the commercial syllabus at Eagle Flight Center.  If life stays on track, I will be graduating in May of 2016.  

I have been interested in aviation as long as I can remember.  My grandfather was one of the first people in Michigan to solo at the age of 16 after that FAR was passed, and owned his own plane and business ever since.  I remember flying in his light twin when I was as young as 4 years old, not being able to see over the panel.  Due to poor life decisions, I never had the money to start flying on my own and I enlisted in the Air Force directly out of high school.  I spent 6 years as an Airborne Cryptologic Arabic Language Analyst and Airborne Tactical Systems Operator.  I was fortunate enough to gain 700 hours of combat flight time as an enlisted air crew member before getting out and putting my GI bill to work for me.  Eastern Michigan University was located perfectly between my original hometown and that of my wife's, and they had an aviation program that was GI bill qualified, so it was absolutely the best choice available to get myself and my family where we wanted to go.

After graduation, my first choice for the future is to commission in the Air National Guard as an F-22 pilot.  They tell me there are spots available in Hawaii and Virginia, and I'd be willing to go to either location without question.  Not only is the F-22 just flat out awesome, I have a mindset that matches the mission that it is designed to fulfill.  I do, however, have a feeling that it's not going to work out for me due to my having ocular hypertension.  The liquid in my eyeballs has a pressure that far exceeds the range of normal humans, and therefore I have a high probability of having glaucoma at a young age.  The Air Force does not currently have a waiver for this condition, even if controlled by medication because there aren't significant long term studies on people with this condition in a high altitude setting.  Therefore, my back up plan is to gain some time instructing here at Eagle Flight Center or possibly at another airport like New Hudson or Howell.  Once I have the hours and other qualifications necessary, I'd like to be picked up for a job flying King Air's or small business jets in the corporate aviation sector.  I believe the relatively higher amount of down time, along with relatively higher initial salaries, would benefit my family more so than that of the regional airlines.  When I retire, I would absolutely love doing acrobatic or old barnstorming air shows similar to those performed by Dewey Davenport, our future guest speaker.

I'm excitedly looking forward to his night to speak.  I believe that's a niche in the aviation world that is exciting and very often overlooked, especially from the viewpoint of someone who is looking for a paying career in aviation.